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The Structural Transformation of the Japanese Enterprise Groups after the Economic Recession of the 1990s
This paper argues that the ongoing restructuring process and big bang acceleration in Japan's financial sector precipitate changes in the organizational structure and corporate governance of the 'kigyo-shudan,' or bank-centered, e..
Yongsok Choi Date 1999.12.30
Business managementDownloadContentSummaryThis paper argues that the ongoing restructuring process and big bang acceleration in Japan's financial sector precipitate changes in the organizational structure and corporate governance of the 'kigyo-shudan,' or bank-centered, enterprise groups. It pays particular attention to the effect of the government restructuring policies on the enterprise groups as they deal with these changes, and maintains that their structural transformation can best be understood if equal emphasis is placed on examining both institutional and economic factors.
The organizational structure of Japan's six enterprise groups - Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, and Dai-Ichi Kangyo - was considered to have been well entrenched since having been (re)established after World War II.
Typically classified as organizational isomorphisms, they are characterized by the 'keiretsu' structure, meaning a vertical alignment of firms of different sizes. Each enterprise group consists of member firms that are connected horizontally, often active in different industries. A member firm maintains vertically aligned and affiliated subsidiary firms. These subsidiary firms are, in addition, affiliated with many medium and small sized subcontracting firms ranked as either primary, secondary, or tertiary, depending on size and closeness. Also, each enterprise group has its own banks, insurance companies, and trading firms for the common financial and distributive needs of the member firms.
Once established, the organizational structure of the postwar business combine is considered to have become entrenched thereafter, referred to either as an 'intermarket group' (Dodwell 1984), or 'financial keiretsu,' or 'kigyo-shudan (enterprise group).' However, with the implementation of the major financial reform policies of the Japanese government after the economic recession of the 1990s aimed at revitalizing the economy, the keiretsu structure is considered to have entered a phase of rapid transition. If ongoing financial reform measures are implemented successfully, the kigyo-shudan will no longer be able to preserve their current structures, because financial institutions have so far acted as their de facto holding companies.
The financial reform measures include the enactment of the financial system reform law, legalization of the financial holding company, withdrawal of the full-deposit protection scheme, corporate accounting reform and the boosting of foreign competition. As a result of these measures, the unwinding of cross shareholdings in the enterprise groups is being accelerated, the role of capital market financing is increasing, greater transparency is required, the 'national' identity of the enterprise groups is withering and their internal labor market is changing.
The above statement implies that the current structural transformation of the Japanese enterprise groups is attributable not only to their efforts at adapting to the changing market environment, but also to the legitimizing efforts of the crisis-ridden state under environmental uncertainties. The 'political repercussions' of the economic crisis threatened the state and caused it to respond with counter-crisis policies for legitimation, in the form of socio-political and economic reforms. The policies of the legitimacy-pressured state led to the institutionalized sanctioning of the business practices and economic activities of the Japanese enterprise groups, resulting in controlled market behavior. As a result, the possibility is greater than ever that the keiretsu structure of the enterprise groups, preserved throughout the postwar period, will finally be transformed or may even disappear completely. -
Searching for an Economic Agenda for 3rd ASEM Summit
ASEM, being still under probation in the sense that its action plans have not yet been transformed into real action, needs to be consolidated in terms of its goals and agenda. In this regard, this paper seeks to investigate the ag..
Chong Wha LEE Date 1999.12.30
Economic cooperationDownloadContentSummaryASEM, being still under probation in the sense that its action plans have not yet been transformed into real action, needs to be consolidated in terms of its goals and agenda. In this regard, this paper seeks to investigate the agenda setting for the 3rd ASEM summit that will be held in 2000. For more than just symbolic reasons, the year 2000 provides ASEM with an excellent occasion for both retrospect and prospect, allowing it to pursue a revision of its agenda and thereby articulate its goals. In addressing this topic, the focus is on testing Gerald Segal's 'subsidiarity question' for ASEM--which is to ask, 'what can best be done for ASEM?'-- taking into account the recent development of ASEM's economic dialogues.
Several features deserve attention. First, the progress achieved at ASEM does not yet meet the requirement dictated by the subsidiarity question. Consequently, ASEM will have to become more than a venue for verbal exchanges and ministerial rhetoric extolling its achievements if it is to survive in the new millennium. As for the future of ASEM navigation, there seems to be two broad scenarios: 'an APEC type evolution scenario' and 'ASEM's own pace of evolution scenario.' Second, as for the former, a more forward-looking strategy for ASEM would be aimed at achieving a goal matching trade liberalization measures and a non-binding regional investment initiative such as those in place in APEC. Under this scenario, especially concerning trade liberalization, it not only brightens ASEM navigation but also provides a decisive momentum to multilateral liberalisation. Third, under 'ASEM's own pace of evolution scenario' its agenda will be basically aimed at facilitating information networks. Much of the economic agenda can be left to the markets to manage.
ASEM would still remain a consultative forum. Consequently, It is questionable whether ASEM will truly be meaningful in the sense that it helps to develop and strengthen a more open multilateral trading system. Under this scenario, one possible agenda would be merely follow-up activities on ongoing works, namely: (1) concerted efforts for open multilateralism in general and investment liberalization in particular; (2) reinforcement of technology transfer combined with protection of intellectual property rights; (3) active transfer of knowledge, especially in areas such as education and human resource development; (4) improvement of infrastructure linkages; and (5) enhancement of business exchanges. One practical way to enhance such a network is to launch an Asia-Europe Trade Week (AETW). Fourth, taking into account the new initiatives agreed upon at EMM Ⅱ, including a non-binding study of the TFAP and a voluntary report and review mechanism conducive to FDI, a more plausible scenario will be somewhere in between the two. Fifth, whatever the case is, one should bear in mind that the Asian and European industrial sectors are primarily complementary, both in manufacturing and services and, thus, are expected to provide healthy potential for cooperation. Lastly, what is certain is that out of the current crisis comes a new opportunity to build a much stronger, more varied and longer-lasting Asia-Europe relationship. Now, the time has come.
Following the recovery from the financial turmoil in East Asia and the successful launch of the euro, the conditions have been improved for ASEM, allowing it to make great strides in the new millenium. For more than just symbolic reasons, the year 2000 provides an excellent occasion for building a more grandiose vision of ASEM which should serve as the foundation for a solid international economic order for the twenty-first century. -
How to Sequence Capital Market Liberalization: Lessons from the Korean Experience
Since a global financial market and its potential volatility pose such a grave potential danger for most emerging economies, individual countries and the international community should find ways and build mechanisms, by which the ..
Inseok Shin et al. Date 1999.12.30
Financial liberalization, Capital marketDownloadContentSummarySince a global financial market and its potential volatility pose such a grave potential danger for most emerging economies, individual countries and the international community should find ways and build mechanisms, by which the systemic risk of global financial instability could be minimized. Most of all, at the national level, the old question on how market opening should be sequenced may need re-examination in a new perspective. The old wisdom holds that properly and orderly sequenced external liberalization should be from the current account to the capital account and capital account liberalization should be in the order of long-term to short-term. However, after the recent crisis, heated debates are not on how to get the sequencing right, but on how to deal with the volatility of short-term capital flows.
In fact, there are often-heard voices advocating temporary controls over capital inflows a la Chilean scheme, which should be introduced before a crisis occurs, or controls over capital outflows, a la Malaysian way, which should be applied after crisis arises especially if a country is in the transition period of strengthening the institutional and regulatory domestic financial institutions. At the same time, the argument for an enhanced disclosure requirement and changes in current bank lending procedures to hedge funds is also gaining force. Maybe, we had better get ready to see more emerging markets trying various mechanisms for controlling short-term capital inflows, including hedge funds, on the other hand and fostering long-term capital inflows, such as foreign direct investment, on the other hand.
This development of policy interests suggests that the question on sequencing should be dealt with in a rather broadened scope. Indeed, the main purpose of this paper is to argue that the scope should go beyond mere contemplation on carriers of capital flows and comprise considerations on incentives of domestic and international agents who make use of those carriers.
The most serious sequencing problem in Korea was to liberalize short-term financing through banks rather than long-term financing, and to underestimate the potential devastating impact on the economy when massive capital inflows have come to reverse. Although long-term capital inflows were rather repressed during the pre-crisis period, it would be an exaggeration to say that short-term capital movements were liberalized greatly. Neither firms nor banks could sell their short-term debt instruments in domestic currency to foreigners. Only liberalized were trade-related financing of firms and short-term foreign currency borrowings of banks.
The intention was clear: liberalize first capital flows that are only trade related. Then, how about short-term foreign currency borrowings of banks? Should the Korea government have restricted short-term borrowings of banks? Probably the answer is No. It is extremely costly to control short-term transactions of banks. What was lacking was financial supervision and appropriate risk management. Without strengthening banking supervision and enhancing corporate governance, corporate debt crisis will be an inevitable outcome. In this regard, the main lesson of the Korean crisis is not the sequencing problem in the capital market liberalization, but the structural deficiencies as prerequisites of capital market liberalization. -
OECD Regulatory Reform Reviews: The U.S., the Netherlands, Japan, Mexico
It has become increasingly clear in recent years that bad regulatory regimes can reduce economic growth by reducing competitiveness and openness while fostering distortions which encourage corruption or mismanagement of resources...
Junsok Yang et al. Date 1999.12.30
DownloadContentSummaryIt has become increasingly clear in recent years that bad regulatory regimes can reduce economic growth by reducing competitiveness and openness while fostering distortions which encourage corruption or mismanagement of resources. For the last several years, OECD has engaged in a study of regulatory reform of its members with a view to cataloging the best and worst practices of the member governments, and suggesting possible improvements to the members' regulatory regimes.
To this end, OECD has issued an extensive report on regulatory reform in 1997, and issued recommendations to the ministers of the member governments. The ministers in turn, ordered the OECD secretariat and committees to engage in a comprehensive reviews of the regulatory reforms in OECD member governments. In 1998, as the first step, the OECD issued a report on regulatory reforms of four member countries: The United States, the Netherlands, Japan and Mexico. The report was completed and published in late 1999.
The country reviews took place in seven areas: The effect of regulatory reform on the economy; government capacity to assure high quality regulation; the role of competition policy in regulatory reform; enhancing market openness through regulatory reform; regulatory reform in the electricity sector; and regulatory reform in the telecommunications sector. At the end of the report, OECD also offered suggestions on further regulatory reform for each members.
This report summarizes the policy components of the OECD country reports. Due to space constraints, we concentrate on the historical and policy portions of the report and excludes the portions dealing with the electricity and telecommunications sectors.
We also look at the implications of the OECD country reports on the ongoing Korean regulatory reform. Korea is scheduled for OECD regulatory reform country review in 1999, and we also look at the possible problems which may come up in the 1999 OECD Korean regulatory reform review. -
China's Accession into WTO and Its Multi-Faceted Impact on East Asia and the Korean Economy
- It is certain that China will join WTO by June next year, although its accession is still conditioned by the successful conclusion of bilateral negotiations with EU and other major members of WTO, ratification by the China's Peo..
Icksoo Kim Date 1999.12.30
Economic opening, Economic developmentDownloadContentSummary- It is certain that China will join WTO by June next year, although its accession is still conditioned by the successful conclusion of bilateral negotiations with EU and other major members of WTO, ratification by the China's Peoples Congress, and the consensus(or approval) among the General Directors' Meeting of the WTO.
- Under such circumstances, this report aims to study the multi-faceted direct as well as indirect effects of China's accession upon China's economic reform, world trading environment, East Asian politico-economic front, and finally the prospects of the Korean economy.
- First of all, it is clear from the WTO accession protocol that China's entry into WTO would enhance the accessibility of foreign firms into the Chinese market fraught with various tariff and non-tariff barriers(NTBs). The increase in the number of foreign transnational and multinational firms entering the China market would intensify the competition among firms in China and promote the gradual transformation of the nature of China's market from suppliers' market into buyers' market. In the process, however, such sectors as agriculture, state-owned enterprises, stated-owned specialized banks as well as local international trust and investment corporations that have weak global competitiveness will be faced with mergers, spinoffs, and bankruptcies.
- China would enjoy negligible impact effect associated with tariff concession to be made by the existing WTO members, since it has already been granted MFN status by them under the respective bilateral arrangements. More gradual yet more long-standing effect would stretch over a long period until 2005 as China accelerates its reform efforts to keep up with its promises and commitments it has made. Legal policies and trade systems shall be improved, whereas the tax incentive to foreign firms will be gradually phased out. The net effect would be the sharpening of China's price and non-price competitiveness, which would force the Korea's share to fall in major overseas export markets including the U. S., EU, and Japan.
- In addition, there are some major uncertainties concerning China's honoring of its promises and commitments at the stage of implementation. Major foreseeable obstacles are backward legal systems, guanxi-based culture, localism, and rampant practices of corruption. Overall, however, by the end of 2005 when major NTBs are to be abolished, China would enter into the preliminary stage of market economy in which competition and efficiency prevails.
- When it comes to the impact on the Korean economy, China's accession into WTO would bring about increases in export to China in sectors such as textile, petro-chemical, iron & steel industries. Industries such as electronic parts and components, semiconductors, telecommunications, and computer software industries would also see certain positive effects. However, automobile, high-tech home appliances should witness only a natural trend growth in exports to China since those sectors continue to be protected by comparatively high tariffs up until 2005.
- The Northeastern part of China, supplying the majority of the agricultural products subject to the lower tariffs and increased import quota, may redouble its efforts to market its excess agricultural products into the neighboring export markets of Japan and Korea. This necessitates Korean government to improve the sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards, customs procedures and the country of origin procedures related to agricultural and marine products. The imposition of special safeguards and special anti-dumping duties, however, should be the last resort subject to careful consideration because such action may provoke China's complaints and/or retaliation, and possibly Sino-Korean trade disputes. Rather, it is advisable that Korea goes to the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO for the multilateral settlement of the case in question. - China's accession into the WTO is a boon to Korea since Korean firms may be able to exploit the niche markets of China's service industries, including finance, insurance, securities, distribution, audio& visual, travel, telecommunications, and internet are regarded promising. To this aim, Korean firms may need to diversify their entry modes into management contract, franchising, SOHO, and technical licensing from the existing modes of export and FDI.
- Over the long haul, however, it is essential that Korean firms sharpen their competitive edge over Chinese products in the quality of products and services by increasing R&D investments and utilizing international licensing. By so doing, they may be able to defend overseas and domestic markets and make more effective inroads than ever into the China's domestic market. -
Assessment of Korea's Individual Action Plans of APEC
Korea made a significant progress towards the OAA(Osaka Action Agenda) objectives and Bogor goals through the implementation of IAPs(Individual Action Plan) 1996 to 1998. Korea removed its barriers to trade and investment in vari..
Hyungdo Ahn et al. Date 1999.12.30
Economic cooperation, Trade policyDownloadContentSummaryKorea made a significant progress towards the OAA(Osaka Action Agenda) objectives and Bogor goals through the implementation of IAPs(Individual Action Plan) 1996 to 1998. Korea removed its barriers to trade and investment in various areas, enhanced transparency, took policy reforms, and amended the laws and regulations to achieve the OAA Objectives and Bogor Goals. Korea's performances in non-tariff measures and investment are outstanding.
Performances in Services, Standard and Conformance, Government Procurement, and Mobility of Business People are also noteworthy. However, Korea needs to do better in the areas of Intellectual Property Rights, Deregulation, and Rules of Origin. -
The Mekong River Basin Development:
The Mekong River, flowing through Yunnan Province, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, is the largest river in Southeast Asia and those countries' lifeline as well. The area, since the end of 1980s, has undergone rapid ..
Jae-Wan Cheong Date 1999.12.30
Economic developmentDownloadContentSummaryThe Mekong River, flowing through Yunnan Province, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, is the largest river in Southeast Asia and those countries' lifeline as well. The area, since the end of 1980s, has undergone rapid economic growth due to the conversion to a market-oriented economy system and a policy of continuous economic development. The tremendous economic growth potential of this area stems from its abundant labor force and natural resources.
Activities to develop the Mekong River Basin resumed in the first half of the 1990s. Much of the support for the Mekong River Basin Development Plan has been undertaken under the auspices of the ADB, MRC, and ESCAP. The Mekong Development Project focuses on several key sectors: traffic, energy, communications, trade and investment. These SOC construction projects, including the TAR (Trans-Asia Railway) Project, make for an extremely attractive market. However, the Mekong River Basin Development suffered a setback following the financial crisis in East Asia that began in July 1997.
The development of various infrastructural elements, such as roads and energy, are urgently required for continued economic growth and the inducement of foreign capital for the Basin development. Furthermore, as the economies in the region have begun to recover from the financial crisis, it is expected that the Basin development activities will resume. With all the nations in the region having joined ASEAN, except for China, the region has become even more important and is expected to experience accelerated economic development backed by repercussions of economic growth. In particular, if the GMS Fund, which was discussed at a regional meeting in Manila in September 1998, is established, the development of the Mekong River Basin Development may be expedited.
There will certainly be renewed interest in investing in the region by Japan, Australia and Europe as the Basin is increasingly seen as being an untapped but potentially lucrative new market. The existing ASEAN members will also continue their active participation in the Basin Development through the 'One Southeast Asia (ASEAN 10)' banner.
Korea had a great deal of interest in the Basin Development even prior to the ASEM summit in March 1996, and Korean corporations had been active in road construction and hydraulic power projects, and government aid, which had been inadequate up to that point, has been expanded and facilitated since the summit. While Korea remains keenly interested in participating in the development of the area, the lingering effects of its economic crisis prevent it from immediate participation in the Basin Development. Taking into account, however, the fact that the Basin and Southeast Asia are Korea's largest markets and possess great potential for future growth, it is essential that Korea's active participation in the region is viewed in a mid and long-term context. -
A Case Study of Foreign M&A of Major Industry: Implication for Korean firms
There have been numerous merger and acquisition (M&A) activities in the world, primarily in the United States and Europe. Cross-border M&A transactions have also been on the rise. In the United States, most M&A activ..
Jong-Keun Kim Date 1999.12.30
DownloadContentSummaryThere have been numerous merger and acquisition (M&A) activities in the world, primarily in the United States and Europe. Cross-border M&A transactions have also been on the rise.
In the United States, most M&A activities have, thus far, taken place among large firms, but lately even more large firms have joined the trend. Consequently, the volume of mergers has been steadily increasing.
With the launching of the European Monetary Union (EMU), there has been a wave of mergers among large European firms in response to the enlarged market.
In addition to Europe, where universal firms have traditionally been permitted, firms in the United States and Japan have increasingly conducted intersector transactions, following the relaxation of regulations governing such transactions in those markets.
M&A activities have become prevalent worldwide as more countries have opened themselves up economically with the launching of the World Trade Organization.
The 1990s have seen an almost unlimited, transnational competition among firms everywhere with the advent of globalization and the development of information technologies.
In response to those conditions, many firms adopted strategies designed to meet them. They have increased their market power by raising market share. They have also reduced unit costs and increased operating efficiency by eliminating redundant facilities and personnel.
Overall economic conditions are favorable in the United States and Europe. When the economic conditions are likely to remain favorable for the foreseeable future, firms tend to increase their size and expand into other businesses since the cash flow is vibrant and the expected rates of return are predictable.
M&A intermediaries, such as investment banks, contribute to the rise in the number of M&A transactions by assisting in the process of selecting and evaluating firm suitable for merger or acquisition, negotiating the terms and signing the agreements.
Korea can gain valuable insights and knowledge by understanding, and learning from, the increased M&A activities. Korean firms need to focus on increasing profit margins by restructuring themselves and adopting advanced skills and techniques. -
A New Strategy for Norteast Asian Economic Cooperation: Regional Economic Cooperation for Trade Issues
The need for economic cooperation between Northeast Asian countries is increasing due to several factors. These are the deepening of the economic interdependence among the three countries; the need for the prevention of overlappin..
Inkyo Cheong ed. Date 1999.12.30
Economic cooperationDownloadContentSummaryThe need for economic cooperation between Northeast Asian countries is increasing due to several factors. These are the deepening of the economic interdependence among the three countries; the need for the prevention of overlapping investment in major regional industries; as a response to the formation of economic blocs in the world economy and the growing number of fields requiring the coordination of common interests such as fishing activity rights and the problem of trans-boundary pollution.
None of the Northeast Asian countries has joined any regional trade agreement so far but and Japan and Korea have recently renewed their interest in concluding some kind of regional trade agreement. Also, China has intensified its trade liberalization process and tried to modernize its institutions in order to become a member of the WTO. Thus, the possibility of establishing Northeast Asian economic cooperation is higher than ever before.
However, we still face some obstacles in achieving any kind of economic integration in the form of a Free Trade Area because of widening intraregional trade imbalance, the economic differences between members, China's adherence to its socialist regime and also a lingering and bitter history in the region. Therefore, in creating the Northeast Asian Free Trade Area, we need to implement a strategy that will gradually lead to regional economic integration while overcoming the aforementioned obstacles. That is, it is essential for the three countries to actively pursue coordination for the successful launch of regional economic integration. In the short-term, we need to standardize and modernize the differing trade norms of each country, such as customs procedures, anti-dumping rules, the unification of product classification, rules of origin, etc, in order to lay the groundwork for economic integration and we should implement a common incentive policy to accelerate the restructuring and cooperation of regional industries. In the mid-term, we should facilitate intra-regional trade by reducing tariff rates of items of concern for the three countries as well as for Japanese tariff rates with high customs duties. In the long-term, we should create the Northeast Asian Free Trade Area by achieving mutually preferential trade liberalization based on a liberalization scenario designed to solve the regional trade imbalance. The liberalization scenario consists of the differential liberalization based on the early trade liberalization of Japan and the subsequent liberalization Korea and China at the midpoint of Japan's liberalization process. In addition to tariff reduction, deliberate measures for promoting intraregional trade, such as preferential ROO, will be needed.
In order to carry out this long-term economic integration program successfully, we need to create the Northeast Asian Economic Integration Promoting Commission composed of high level officials and professionals from each country, which will occur when there exits a favorable environment within each of the three countries for integration. The commission will be responsible for preparing long-term plan for integrating the three economies and for overseeing the integration process into a single free market. -
2000 World Economic Outlook
Since the recent turbulence in emerging markets, which gave rise to fears of global recession, has settled down, most of the economies recently in crisis have begun to recover, and the economic conditions of the major industrial c..
Jong-Hwa Cho eds Date 1999.12.30
DownloadContentSummarySince the recent turbulence in emerging markets, which gave rise to fears of global recession, has settled down, most of the economies recently in crisis have begun to recover, and the economic conditions of the major industrial countries are robust. The international financial environment has stabilized with the spread, to the emerging market economies, declining after the Brazilian crisis in January. The Japanese economy recorded a positive growth rate in the first half of 1999 after a negative growth in 1998, expectations for a European economic recovery have materialized, and the U.S. economy has maintained its long-term growth with low inflation and a low unemployment rate.
The world economy in 2000 will show stable growth with the economic conditions of the crisis affected economies being improved and the Japanese and European economies recovered. The U.S. economy will show a slowing of growth to sustainable rates, a soft landing, due to the correction of the stock market and an increase in interest rates. The low interest rates and an recovery of the Asian economies will help the Japanese economy to grow faster than it had in 1999. The EU economy will grow by 2.6-3.1 percent based on the improvement of consumer and business confidence, and the increase in exports to emerging market economies. The continuation of the economic restructuring and the improvement of the international economic environment will lead the East Asian economies to strong growth.
However, there remain risks which may hinder the stable growth of the world economy. First, the slowdown in the U.S. economy may be more abrupt than expected if inflation pressure grows, or if the stock market correction surpasses expectations. Secondly, if the economic recovery of the Japanese and the European economies will not be sufficient, the Asian developing economies and the Latin American countries will suffer. Thirdly, large increases in current account imbalances among the major economies may create protectionist pressures or destabilizing movements in international exchange rates.