The purpose of this research is to propose policy implications and recommendations for the government’s New Southern Policy from the perspective of trade issues, thus enabling a more integrated policy that can be linked with Korea's ODA strategy and also strengthen global value chains in ASEAN and India. In order to achieve these research objectives, this report reviewed the recent developments in and characteristics of foreign relations in strategic regions to the south of Korea and compared the ODA strategies for major countries in the new southern regions. In addition, after analyzing the global value chain in new southern regions and empirically studying the relationship between the global value chain and ODA, we present suggestions for ODA policy and concrete policy measures.
   Chapter 2 of this report looked at the overall economic trends of ASEAN and India, focusing on macroeconomic relations, foreign trade and investment, and foreign aid. ASEAN has a population of about 640 million – including Indonesia (250 million), the Philippines (105 million), and Vietnam (94 million people) – and is classified as a region with the third largest population in the world after China and India. In 2017, ASEAN’s GDP was US$2.8 trillion, similar to that of the United Kingdom and France, whereas the growth rate of all 10 ASEAN member economies has begun to slow down over the last 10 years. However, recent members of ASEAN (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) achieved a 6.1% growth rate in 2017 and a higher rate of economic growth than the founding members (4.6% in the same year). In terms of the economic size of the 10 ASEAN economies, Indonesia accounted for 36.7% of the total GDP of ASEAN in 2017, followed by Thailand (16.9%), Malaysia (11.9%), Singapore (11.7%) and the Philippines (11.3%), while the Vietnamese economy recorded a share of 8.7% and continues to show strong growth.
   On the other hand, ASEAN trade is affected by external factors such as the global financial crisis and protectionism, but the trade volume of ASEAN has been steadily increasing due to the aggressive opening policy of ASEAN and high growth of China. The increase in trade with ASEAN is analyzed as being influenced by the attractiveness of foreign investment. Foreign investment is also steadily increasing due to the economic potential of the region as well as aggressive policies to attract foreign investment. Official development assistance (ODA) has also positively influenced the steady economic growth in the ASEAN region. In particular, ODA plays an important role in improving the connectivity of ASEAN in order to bridge the economic gap between ASEAN members with different levels of economic development.
   India also has a large economy (equivalent to US$ 2.6 trillion in 2017) that is comparable to that of ASEAN. Unlike ASEAN, India is characterized not by manufacturing but by service industries. However, since the launch of the Modi government, India has established and implemented the “Make in India” policy to strengthen its manufacturing industry and hence cooperation with Korea will become more important in the future. In addition, foreign investment into India is increasing rapidly. We can identify the labor force, market potential, talented manpower, and English-friendly environment in the nation as main factors to increase foreign investment.
   As previously analyzed, ASEAN and India are emerging as an important region for the global value chain of Korean companies, as exports of intermediate goods account for a larger share of Korea-ASEAN and Korea-India trade in goods. As a result, the investment of Korean companies in both ASEAN and India has been rapidly increasing. In particular, investments are being made in various sectors such as the manufacturing, mining, and service industries. In India, the concentration of manufacturing activity has become more pronounced under the Modi administration.
   Chapter 3 of this report analyzes the current status and strategies of Japan and China on ASEAN and India, and then draws policy implications through comparison with Korea. Overall, Japan's strategy is similar to Korea's, while China's strategy shows many differences. First, Korea and Japan have concentrated their ODA in the Asian region, while China is focusing on the African continent. In addition, Japan is also pursuing ODA strategies in conjunction with the expansion of the global value chain. China, on the other hand, is focused on securing the necessary production resources for its sustained economic growth. Also, while Korea and Japan as a rule do not use ODA for political purposes, China is actively utilizing ODA as a political or diplomatic means. This is because Korea and Japan are members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and are obliged to comply with regulations set by the DAC. On the other hand, since China is not a member of the DAC, it is free to actively seek political compensation after providing loans to countries with high geopolitical and diplomatic importance. Therefore, regarding the ODA strategy for ASEAN and India, Korea is in a competitive relationship with Japan and at the same time shares similar interests, and hence the two nations can expect to cooperate in various areas.
   Chapter 4 of this report analyzes the current state of global value chains in both ASEAN and India and draws implications for Korea's ODA policy based on this analysis. Considering the size of Korea’s ODA support, we selected Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines among ASEAN member countries and included in the analysis the market potential and future economic cooperation with these countries. After selecting the main export industries of each country, we analyzed the GVC structure by disassembling the exports of the relevant industries in the corresponding countries. The conclusion from this GVC analysis is that Laos and Cambodia have a stronger global value chain structure with China, Indonesia with Japan, and the Philippines and India with the United States; Vietnam alone has formed a strong GVC with Korea, in the textile, clothing, and electric and electronic industries.
   In Chapter 5, we analyzed the relationship between the global value chain and ODA statistically, and also studied how ODA causes changes in comparative advantage as a production base of the country. In particular, ODA can mitigate the shortcomings of developing countries through various channels. First, it can improve the level of infrequent infrastructure through ODA, thus securing a comparative advantage as a production base for multinational corporations. The results of the quantitative analysis also showed that aid for trade (AfT), and particularly AfT for improving the infrastructure, has the effect of increasing the comparative advantage of the production base of the country. On the other hand, aid for enhancing productive capacity and for technically supporting trade policies and regulations failed to produce meaningful results. Therefore, in order to expand the global value chain by expanding production bases through ODA, it is necessary to focus more on policy support for economic infrastructure.
   Based on this analysis, this report proposes aid for trade as the main direction of ODA policy in order to link ODA-centered international cooperation with the expansion and strengthening of the global value chain in new southern regions. As previously analyzed in Chapter 5, the total amount of aid for trade and the size of AfT for economic infrastructure showed that the production base comparative advantage index of the source country was statistically significantly increased. This can be interpreted as an indirect way of expanding and strengthening the global value chain in terms of strengthening the comparative advantage of production bases through the establishment of economic infrastructure of the recipient country, rather than as a direct way to engage local companies in the global value chain.
   this study, we selected the key partner countries by combining the results of the global value chain analysis performed in Chapter 4 with the results of our analysis of foreign relations and ODA status and strategy in Chapters 2 to 3. In particular, we comprehensively evaluated the results of the analysis of global value chains in target countries and industries, together with the possibility of economic development in partner countries, their ODA policies and strategies, non-economic international relations and long-term cooperation strategies. In line with these analyses, we selected Vietnam, Indonesia, India, Laos, Cambodia, and the Philippines as the most promising partners for cooperation in the region, i.e. to expand and strengthen the global value chain of the key export industries in the new southern regions, and recommended ODA cooperation projects be more focused in the areas of aid for building economic infrastructure, enhancing productive capacity, technically supporting trade policies and regulations, and cooperation in non-economic fields, such as culture, academic, and education projects. 

   The purpose of thisresearch is to derive policy implications for Korea by comparing and analyzingthe current status and competitiveness of Korea, China, and Japan in theSoutheast Asian market as part of efforts to achieve diversification and enhancementof Korea's export items. Accordingly, the report analyzed the import patternsof consumption goods in the three Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia,Thailand, Vietnam), the determinants of consumption goods trade between Korea,China and Japan (KCJ) and the three Southeast Asian countries, the policies forpromoting export of consumption goods in KCJ and import barriers in the threeSoutheast Asian countries.
   In Chapter 2, we lookedinto Korea's export trends of prospective consumption goods to Southeast Asiaby analyzing import patters of prospective consumption goods to Indonesia,Thailand, and Vietnam, as well as Korea’s e-commerce trade—the composition ofwhich is largely made up of consumption goods.
   In Chapter 3, this research empiricallycompared and analyzed determinants of products traded in KCJ, Vietnam,Thailand, and Indonesia. The analysis found that unlike the trade of capitalgoods or intermediary goods, consumption goods trade is influenced by culturalsimilarity: the higher the cultural similarity among countries, the more activethe exchange of consumption goods. This is partly because while demandsfor capital and intermediary goods depend on relatively objective rationale,demands for consumption goods are often based on consumers’ preferences orchoice, which are subjective in nature. In this context,the trade of recreational services, such as broadcasting and education, canplay a complementary role in the trade of consumption goods. The study alsofound that consumption goods are more in affected by the e-commerceinfrastructure level than other products.
   In Chapter 4, this research first reviewed andcompared policies for promoting consumption goods and e-commerce in Korea, China, and Japan. Then we examined import barriers in Indonesia, Thailand, andVietnam.
   Compared to Korea, Chinafocusesmore on supervising and its ever-growing e-commerce market andstrengthening its management system, rather than on specific policy supports. Atthe same time, the government is pursuing a trial-based policy in which certaincities and regions are selected as testbeds for cross-border e-commerce, thanthe number is increased eventually to include the entire country. For Japan, itwas found that they exercise only a few direct support policies and even lesssubsidies, while for e-commerce, Japan provides provisions as a guideline forcross-border e-commerce. In this regard, Korean government’s e-commerce supportpolicy is much more direct and specific compared to China and Japan’s. In thefuture, it is necessary to prepare a comprehensive policy response throughcooperation between government ministries and spread success cases byimplementing adequate policy evaluation, etc.
   Next, the import barriers of Indonesia,Thailand and Vietnam in Southeast Asia are found to be relatively high.According to the TradeNAVI Integrated Trade Information Service provided by theMinistry of Trade, Industry and Energy and the Korea International TradeAssociation, Vietnam (49 cases), Indonesia (33 cases), and Thailand (21) aretaking non-tariff measures on various items such as food and beverage, cosmetics,medicine and medical devices. The measures include certification, quarantine,quantity control, technical barriers, etc.
   In Chapter 5, the following policy suggestionswere drawn based on the report analysis, in order to revitalize the consumptiongoods trade in Southeast Asia contents: First, it is necessary to re-evaluatethe effectiveness of Korea's export-promoting policies and preparecountermeasures accordingly.
   Second, it is necessary tocome up with comprehensive measures to promote exports of consumer goods toSoutheast Asian countries in connection with Korea’s New South Asian policy. Tothis end, the government should consider measures to improve the utilization ofFTAs, eliminate non-tariff barriers, establishing a research organization thatprovides in-depth market information, etc.
   Third, efforts to eliminatenon-tariff barriers, simplify import customs, expand Country RecognitionAgreement (CRA), etc. are imperative, as measures to prepare for theKorea-Indonesia CEPA negotiation.  
   Fourth, continuous effortsare needed to expand and supervise the Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRA)partner countries, in order to reduce the time and cost of import customs andlogistics bound for Southeast Asian countries. 
   Finally, this paperproposed linking Korea’s consumption goods export stimulus policy to its serviceexport promotion policy. 

   This study examines changes in trade-related laws and systems in North Korea and actual trade practices, and analyzes them in accordance with international standards (the WTO regulatory framework). Recently, as the situation on the Korean Peninsula changes rapidly, interest in economic cooperation has risen in hand with the improvements in inter-Korean relations. However, our understanding of the North Korean trade system remains low. In order to prepare for the reform and opening up of North Korea and the resumption of inter-Korean economic cooperation, it is necessary to consider the characteristics of the North Korean trade system and measures to support  advancement.
   The main contents of this study are as follows: an examination of changes in the North Korean foreign trade system from 1990 to 2010, a review of the North Korean trade system and actual trade practices by detailed sectors, and a proposal of improvement plans for the North Korean trade system in accordance with WTO standards.
   Chapter 2 examines the expansion of North Korean trade and changes in related laws and institutions. First, after examining the expansion of North Korea’s trade, explanations are provided in connection with changes in laws and institutions. In addition, we analyze the changes in North Korea-China economic cooperation and the changes in inter-Korean economic cooperation in connection with the changes in the North Korean trade system. In order to understand the problems associated with North Korean trade laws and systems from the viewpoint of South Korea, we discuss the problems caused by the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act of South Korea and provide a review of discussions in the 2000s concerning the conclusion of a CEPA between South and North Korea.
   Chapter 3 analyzes regulations and trading practices within North Korean trade laws and trade system. First, we examined the characteristics of the North Korean trade system and changes by period. Next, we analyzed the characteristics and problems of the North Korean trade system proposed by North Korean businessmen in China. In particular, we conducted an analysis of specific areas within North Korean official and informal trade systems, reviewing the areas of commodity and service trade, investment protection, customs clearance and quarantine, trade relief and dispute resolution.
   Chapter 4 examines issues of concern between the North Korean trade system and international standards, especially WTO rules. In order to overcome the lack of related data, we focus on issues and solutions that arose during the process of transition economies joining the WTO.
   In Chapter 5, we examine the issues and areas requiring improvement within North Korean trade laws and systems. First, we looked at how the North Korean trade system should be improved for economic growth, especially for export-led and foreign-funded economic growth. Next, we examined the issues and areas for improvement that must be addressed to establish a CEPA between the two Koreas. Finally, we looked at how North Korean trade laws and systems should be oriented to conclude a Northeast Asian regional trade agreement. In particular, we suggest an improvement strategy for the North Korean trade system, and negotiation strategy of the Korean government, in preparation for the conclusion of a CEPA. In the long run, North Korea should consider normalizing foreign trade and joining the WTO system. Lastly, we propose a negotiation strategy that takes into consideration the necessary process of persuading WTO members.
   The results of the study indicate that North Korea’s efforts toward legalization were not sufficient to lead the expansion of its trade. Although there have been efforts to establish a proper institutional framework to attract foreign capital into North Korea in the form of foreign investment, inter-Korean trade, and economic cooperation, there are numerous cases demonstrating how institutional devices to protect investors remain insufficient in terms of their actual enforcement. The partial rule of law within North Korea limits the quantitative and qualitative growth of trade, restricts North Korean trade participants to only North Koreans, and restricts the actual binding effect of trade-related legislation even if they are enacted. Improvement will be needed in these areas.
   It appears that North Korea will have no choice but to adopt a strategy that centers on FDI and export-led growth policies, as many Asian countries have, and this will likely proceed in the three stages of signing a CEPA between South and North Korea, concluding regional trade agreements in Northeast Asia, and accession to the WTO. In this process, North Korea will need to: (1) improve its tariffs and non-tariff barriers, (2) solve the problem of partial rule of law, (3) gain the trust of the international community and resolve disputes, and (4) conclude international trade agreements and cultivate human resources. In addition, in order for North Korea to maintain good foreign trade relations and attract investment from the international community, it will be necessary to faithfully carry out trade and investment contracts, to ensure the recovery of profits stemming from investment, and to resolve outstanding debts.
   We hope the findings of this study can offer valuable proposals for the reform of North Korea’s trade system to be considered during the negotiation process of an inter-Korean CEPA. The study is also significant in that it provides general reference data on the trends and characteristics of trade-related laws and regulations within North Korea, which will play a key role in the transition process of the North Korean economy. 

   Law amendments with reference to the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, henceforth) are flooding in Korea. It signals that GDPR is one way or another treated as a landmark for regulatory policy on data space. However, a point to see before such benchmarking is whether GDPR itself is compatible with the WTO Agreement. If not, Korea is likely to suffer from the same trade conflicts as the EU would face. Motivated by the concern, this study seeks to figure out key trade issues of Korea’s recent law amendments inspired by GDPR.
   The GDPR applies to all companies processing the personal data of data subjects residing in the EU, aiming to protect its citizens from privacy and data breaches as well as to facilitate free flow of data in the region. One of the major features of GDPR is the extended jurisdiction, so that it applies to the processing of personal data of the EU data subjects by a company not established in the EU. Non-EU businesses processing the data of EU citizens must appoint a representative in the EU to meet the obligations imposed by GDPR. Such requirement to appoint a local representative may be understood as a compliance measure in the GATS context.
   There is another kind of compliance measure, so-called ‘adequacy test.’ A country outside the EU should be recognised by the European Commission as having adequate protections in place in order to freely transfer personal data to somewhere outside the EU. It is the Commission that makes the final decision on adequacy status. Alternative route for a company without regional establishment to secure adequacy status for offshore processing personal data of EU citizens is to get an approval from supervisory authorities of EU Member States. In such instances, it is necessary for the company to adduce adequate safeguards for the protection of privacy and personal data.
   Is extraterritorial jurisdiction or adequacy test of GDPR trade-friendly then? Despite the lack of any available legal basis in trade agreements, the GATT dispute settlement panel once rejected extraterritorial jurisdiction because it would undermine the legal security of the multilateral trade framework. Adequacy test has potentially severe problems in terms of the GATS consistency. It is basically a discriminatory measure by reasons of origin, so that services and service suppliers are presumed to be of like. Unless such differential treatment is effectively justified by some other characteristics inextricably linked to such origin, it could constitute discrimination under MFN or national treatment obligations on a case-by-case basis. It deserves special attention for the EU to have a safeguard against such potential violations, none other than the GATS Article XIV (General Exceptions). In fact, this option is feasible for the EU because adequacy test is a compliance measure. Recourse to GATS Article XIV is available on the condition that challenged measure is a compliance measure, as far as it may be concerned with protection of privacy and personal data.
   Korea has been maintaining strong opt-in regulation on cross-border data transfer including personal data and space information. Contrary to regulation on space information equipped with solid national security ground, regulation on personal data transfer overseas is relatively vulnerable to trade friction. Views are spreading that Korea should change its policy stance to cope with the 4th industrial revolution, a common saying since 2016. Public sentiment still seems to put more weight on data sovereignty than usage in light of the recent law amendments. Patterns are unusual in law-making. Legislation is lingering in the Personal Information Protection Act that is the general law on the protection of personal data. In contrast, legislative efforts are very active in sectoral laws such as the ‘Telecommunications Business Act (TBA, henceforth)’ and ‘Internet Multimedia Broadcast Services Act (IMBSA, henceforth).’ Seemingly having little connection to the protection of personal data, they frequently adopt extraterritorial jurisdiction, local representative appointment requirement and adequacy test of GDPR.
   There are more to mention. Benchmarking GDPR, amendment bills of TBA and IMBSA claim to stand for relieving reverse discrimination in regulation. In a word, bill drafters presumably intend to solve regulatory issues induced by cross-border supply of value-added telecommunications services through capitalizing extraterritorial jurisdiction and local representative appointment requirement of GDPR. However, it is not unlike we try to open the lock with a wrong key. Figuratively speaking, it is a crossbite between means and end. Regulatory approach of this kind often leads to trade conflicts.
   Much more serious attention is due to two elements of the amendment bill of ‘Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, etc.’ One is the reciprocity provision and the other is the local server requirement. Aiming to authorize overseas transfer of personal data on a reciprocal basis, the former is scheduled to go into effect very soon. This clause is obviously a measure by origin discriminating between foreign online service suppliers. Without MFN exemptions registered in any trade agreements, Korea has no authority to implement such a measure. Although the latter is pending at the National Assembly, it is highly likely to run counter to Korea’s market access and national treatment obligations in the context of GATS and KORUS FTA as well. Therefore, repealing the amendments is greatly advisable to stop Korea from being embroiled in unnecessary trade disputes. 

Preface

Executive Summary

Contributors

Chapter 1. Introduction The European Union under Stress:Why It Matters for South Korea
KIM Heungchong (KIEP) and Françoise B. NICOLAS (Ifri)
1. A bumpy road to economic integration
2. Why this time is different
3. Why all this matters for Korea
4. The structure of the book

Chapter 2. Brexit: the Knowns Amongst the Unknowns ― For the UK, the EU and Third Countries, notably South Korea
Elvire FABRY (Jacques Delors Institute)
1. Introduction
2. State of play of Brexit negotiations
3. Potential scenarios for EU FTAs’ transition
4. A case study: Prospect for South Korea trade relations with the EU and the UK
5. Conclusion

Chapter 3. The Rise of Populism in  the EU and Changes in Political Geography
Matthew J. GOODWIN (Kent University)
1. Introduction
2. The evolution of national populism
3. Explaining the rise: Challenging conventional wisdoms
4. Conclusions

Chapter 4. Whither the Franco-German Motor?Overcoming Disputes and Reaching Compromises
Claire DEMESMAY (DGAP) and Barbara KUNZ (Ifri)
1. Introduction: From wonder to strategy
2. Education and culture
3. Eurozone reform
4. Defence
5. The way ahead
6. Conclusions: Lessons learned

Chapter 5. The EU and the Rise of US Protectionism
Iana DREYER (Borderlex)
1. Introduction
2. The deterioration of EU-US trade relations since the end of the Obama administration
3. EU’s response to the Trump administration’s trade policies
4. Conclusions and implications for Korea

Chapter 6. China and the EU: Main Economic Issues in Trade and Investment
Bernadette ANDREOSSO-O’CALLAGHAN (University of Limerick and Ruhr University Bochum)
1. Introduction
2. Theoretical framework for the appraisal of a bilateral economic relationship with implications on a third country
3. An analysis of the China-EU economic  relationship
4. Statistical analysis of the relationship and implications for South Korea
5. Concluding remarks

Chapter 7. Changing Landscape of Korea’s Economic Relations with Europe
Françoise B. NICOLAS (Ifri)
1. Introduction
2. EU-Korea economic relationship: A quantitative analysis
3. Qualitative analysis: what drives the  relationship
4. Conclusions and prospects

Chapter 8. The Future of the EU and its Implications to Korea
KIM Heungchong (KIEP) and LEE Hyun Jean (KIEP)
1. Introduction
2. Latent problems and revealed challenges
3. Criticisms on the EU regime
4. Projection on the future of the EU
5. Implications for Korea 

   The studies collected in this volume aim to illuminate what kind of challenges the EU and member countries have been facing now, how the challenges are developing, and what kind of implications we can draw for Korea.
   Chapter One is an introductory chapter, first highlighting the importance of crises in the EU’s development and then identifying the major drivers underlying the current difficulties and assessing how serious they are. Then it suggests what may be the major implications for some of the EU’s economic partners, with Korea as a case in point.
   Chapter Two talks about the current status of the Brexit negotiations and its impacts on countries such as Korea. The chapter covers the progress of the Brexit negotiations, chaotic status of post-negotiation politics in the UK, possible scenarios of future developments, and the impacts of Brexit on Korea as a case study. The author argues there is a growing probability for the alternative options of “no deal Brexit” or “no Brexit,” rather than the existing withdrawal agreement, and points out the numerous areas left by Brexit that will need to be addressed in the EU-Korea FTA and new UK-Korea economic relations.
   Chapter Three explores the rise of national populism in contemporary European politics, and the resulting changes in the political geography in Europe. It is very interesting to see how the author argues the current phenomena of rising populism are deep-rooted, much more than a mere response to the 2008 financial crisis, and closely related to the values divide in contemporary Europe.
   The next chapter concerns itself with Franco-German relations, which have been regarded as the motor of European integration. The authors appreciate the unprecedented process of reconciliation between the two countries in the course of European integration, but highlight the fundamental difference between the two countries in fiscal, monetary and defense policies arising from different political cultures. Talking about how the changing geography has placed the two countries into a leading role over the process, they suggest the two countries need to focus on exploring new areas of cooperation ‒ agenda for future challenges in Europe such as digitalization or climate change. This chapter provides ample implications to Korea on how to make regional cooperation work under fierce rivalry and regional dynamics.
   In Chapter Five, the author analyses the crisis in transatlantic relations coming into the Trump administration, and its implications for Korea. According to this chapter, the EU has responded to the protectionist approaches by the US by promoting cooperation with the US against China, staying with the US in the WTO and multilateralism, and the proposal of new trade agreements with the US and other countries. As the protectionist measures proposed by the US grow out of a prior history extending before the Trump administration, the tension is likely to last longer. The author concludes with some implications for Korea’s trade policy.
   Chapter Six covers China and the EU from the perspective of trade and investment. Although the two giants have achieved excellent performances in economic relations over the past several decades, tensions from China’s aggressive investment strategy to Europe have been arising. The author argues that Brexit would lead to the UK’s approach to the US rather than China, and that Korea would benefit from the geo-economic upheaval resulting from Brexit.
   In Chapter Seven, the author explores the recent history of economic relations between the EU and Korea. The author examines the impact of the EU-ROK FTA on trade relations and elaborates on the reason why the trade structure suddenly changed after the FTA. The author argues that is not only the result of tariff and non-tariff barriers elimination, but also of sluggish demand from the EU following the economic crisis in Europe, expanding value chains with third countries by Korean giant companies, and so on. The author also argues that the EU-Japan EPA, recently signed and about to enter into force in early 2019, will have a substantial impact on the EU-Korea trade relations, as Japan and Korea are competing in many industries.
   Chapter Eight examines the prospects of the EU regime and its implications to Korea. The authors talk about recent challenges in the EU such as its ageing society and enlargement process, together with other issues discussed in previous sections, which may have great impacts on discussions of the future of the EU. Then, the authors introduce recent developments toward the future of the EU led by the EU institutions and other players in Europe. Finally, the authors present the implications the EU holds for Korea, and the third countries located in East Asia, making for rare observations to Europeans. 

   This study identifies potential threats to exporters to the U.S. caused by the recent changes in U.S. trade remedies. A close examination is conducted of U.S. trade remedy measures against Korean businesses. The second chapter reviews the political and economic background of the recent legislations for U.S. trade remedies. The third and fourth chapters analyze the institutional and implementational changes in antidumping and countervailing duties, and safeguard measures carried out under the Trump administration, respectively.
   Our results find that the series of amendments to U.S. trade remedy laws aim to grant the two investigation authorities, i.e. the U.S. International Trade Commission and Department of Commerce, greater discretion in making their decisions and in calculating the price advantage provided to foreign exporters. In antidumping and countervailing duty cases such amendments lead to more facile application of a higher dumping margin or subsidy rate to foreign producers through an increase in normal value, use of Particular Market Situation (PMS) or Adverse Facts Available (AFA) or both, and a failure to cooperate on the part of a respondent. In doing so they serve the purpose of strengthening the position of U.S. domestic industries with protectionist tendencies.
   The study shows that the U.S. laws on safeguards, general and security, have not changed much since the enactments, but there has been a significant change in their implementations. The Trump administration has consecutively triggered general safeguard measures against Korean residential washing machines and solar products for the first time in 16 years, and initiated investigations on a threat to national security posed by imported steel, aluminum, and automobile products. It has employed general safeguards to prevent foreign exporters from circumventing antidumping duties, which may not be in line with their original purpose, and has been applying security safeguards rarely used in the past to a breadth of imports, aggressively interpreting the definition of national security. 

Foreword

Executive Summary

Contributor

1. Introduction – framework
1.1 General information - needs
1.2 Scope and objectives
1.3 Literature, theories
1.4 Methodology, process
1.5 Expectations
1.6 Research structure

2. Concepts and definitions – describing the relevant knowledge methodology, the foundation  and
     the structures of the economic model
2.1 Knowledge Management (KM)
2.1.1. Concept, definition
2.1.2.Knowledge characteristics in the Knowledge Management approach
2.1.3. Intellectual Capital
2.1.4. Knowledge Organization and Knowledge Worker
2.1.5. Knowledge Productivity
2.1.6. Knowledge Management process
2.1.7. Knowledge Management tools 
2.1.8. Practical examples of Knowledge Management implementation
2.1.9. Knowledge Economy Pyramid framework
2.1.10.Assessment tools for the readiness to adopt Knowledge Management
2.1.11. The need for Knowledge Economy
2.2 Knowledge Economy (KE)
2.2.1. Concept, definition, and pillars
2.2.2. Functionality 
2.3 Knowledge Triangle (KT)
2.3.1. The stakeholders and their roles
2.3.2. Evolution of the concept – establishing the European Institute of Innovation and Technology
2.3.3. Knowledge Innovation Communities
2.3.4. Measuring performance in innovation
2.3.5. Necessity to improve the Knowledge Triangle
2.4 Triple Helix
2.4.1.Structural harmonization in the Knowledge Economy Pyramid
2.4.2. The outline, concept, and stakeholders
2.4.3. Outlooks
2.4.4. Cycle and functionality
2.5 Smart Specialization
2.5.1. Build up the concept
2.5.2. Stakeholders and partnerships
2.5.3. Smart Specialization Strategy (S3)
2.5.4. The process of implementation
2.5.5. The roles and functionality
2.5.6. Bottom-up approach
2.5.7. Research and Innovation Strategies for Smart Specialization

3. Correlations and synergy – analyzing the knowledge ecosystems
3.1 University – Science
3.1.1. Knowledge generator function
3.1.2. The virtuous knowledge cycle
3.1.3. “Third Mission” of the university, lifelong learning concept and the needed reforms
3.1.4. Education performance around the globe
3.2 Business – Innovation
3.2.1. The two-way approach: bottom-up and top-down
3.2.2. Central axis of the pyramid
3.2.3. Innovation analysis
3.2.4. Touching creativity
3.2.5. Economic value of innovation
3.3 Research – Technology
3.3.1. The role of Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
3.3.2. Best practice: Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology (SAIT)
3.3.3. Build supportive environment
3.4 Government – Administration
3.4.1. Critical correlation for capacity building
3.4.2. Validating the model on different economic environments
3.4.3.Key drivers for establishing the Productivity and Competitiveness Center
3.4.4. Practical correlation: Korean Government – Korea Productivity Center
3.4.5. Adopting the best regulation to foster innovation
3.4.6. Key roles in the public administration innovation initiatives
3.5 Clusters – Community
3.5.1. Enhancing the local potential
3.5.2. Clustering process
3.5.3. The case of Korea: chaebol
3.5.4. Regions of Knowledge
3.5.5. The role of clusters for competitiveness

4. Measurement and indicators – assessment methodologies and indices
4.1 Outputs
4.1.1. Knowledge as resource
4.1.2. Understanding the knowledge before measuring
4.1.3. Productivity and statistics
4.1.4. The art of touching the untouchable
4.1.5. Knowledge Assessment Methodology
4.1.6. Knowledge indices
4.1.7. Global Competitiveness Index (GCI)
4.1.8. Global Manufacturing Competitiveness
4.2 Outcomes
4.2.1. Standard of living and quality of life
4.2.2. Human Development Index
4.2.3. Green Growth
4.3 Action plan
4.3.1. Specific terminology and the abstracting model
4.3.2. The 7 stages of implementation
4.3.3. Build up around the 4 pillars
4.3.4. Policies alignment and reforms
4.4 Perspectives of cooperation
4.4.1. The Knowledge Sharing Program
4.4.2. Planned organizational framework for Romania
4.4.3. Upgrading the cooperation
4.4.4. The role of the Productivity and Competitiveness Center at national level
4.4.5. The proposed action plan for Romania
4.4.6. The benefits of the cooperation
4.5 Lesson learned
4.5.1. Korean development after The Second World War – the 4 milestone of the Knowledge Economy
4.5.2. The way ahead towards Knowledge Economy

5. Impact - validation and sustainability
5.1 Productivity
5.1.1. Productivity as development strategy
5.1.2. Concept’s analysis
5.1.3. Case study: Korean productivity
5.1.4. Korea Productivity Center
5.1.5. Productivity in the European Union
5.2 Macro-economy
5.2.1. Changing of the development paradigm
5.2.2. Economic theories
5.2.3. The status of Knowledge Economy
5.3 Public policy
5.3.1. The context and the role of policymakers
5.3.2. The policy/decision-making process
5.3.3. The stages of policymaking process
5.3.4. Strategical approach
5.3.5. The EU principles for transition to the Knowledge Economy
5.3.6. Where is the knowledge frontier?
5.3.7. Recommendations for building institutional capacity
5.4 Society
5.4.1. The value for money
5.4.2. Comparing development cultures
5.4.3. The supremacy of the model
5.5 International relations
5.5.1. Collaborative approach
5.5.2: Going international

6. Conclusions
6.1 One-stop shop body of knowledge
6.2 The value proposition
6.3 Threefold conclusions for the analyzed economies
6.4 Sum-up the findings
6.5 Research perspective
6.6 Final remarks

Appendix

References 

   The global economy’s landscape needs a new economic model where knowledge is used as a valuable resource to stimulate innovation, creativity, and entrepreneurship in order to increase productivity and competitiveness for sustainable growth as a premise for social welfare. The policymakers have to design the new public policy for productivity and competitiveness considering the Knowledge Economy frontier and to establish the institutional capacity to manage the knowledge perspective of development. The Knowledge Economy Pyramid model is a catalyst of knowledge ecosystems from education, research, technology, business, innovation, government and local communities, capable to create a collaborative environment with synergy effect: transforming knowledge value in increasing productivity and competitiveness.
   The Knowledge Economy Pyramid is a robust framework based on the four pillars of Knowledge Economy with three effective and powerful structures build upon: Knowledge Triangle, Triple Helix, and Smart Specialization. The main axis which unifies these structures is education-business and all the other stakeholders from research, science, technology, government, administration, clusters, and community are equal contributors to process the knowledge along the central shaft.
   Considering the Knowledge Economy Pyramid model, this research work is defining the coordinates of the public policy for productivity and competitiveness which will be implemented by the institutional capacity – Productivity and Competitiveness Center. This institution is a concrete and accurate representation of the Knowledge Economy Pyramid model with the scope to implement the principles of Knowledge Economy to increase productivity and competitiveness as outputs of the process. Moreover, the capacity building will provide the premises to conclude the new public policy into outcomes: standard of living, well-being, quality of life, and green growth.
   Knowledge Economy Pyramid provides a toolkit for policy/decision- makers to take action in order to improve the activity at any stage of development or maturity for an economy or institution related with productivity and competitiveness and it is able to measure the gap between actual development level and the knowledge edge.
   From an economic perspective, to analyze the concepts of productivity and competitiveness in Knowledge Economy, this study is a very complex work where the tangible is mixed with the intangible, human with technology, economic growth with people prosperity. This study is a “one-stop shop” for all the policy/decision-makers, leaders, representatives, officials, professors, researchers, specialists and practitioners, all engaged in the work to transform the traditional economic model into a new one, according to the Knowledge Economy Pyramid framework.

Keywords:Knowledge Economy; Knowledge Triangle; Triple Helix; Smart Specialization; innovation; productivity; competitiveness; sustainable growth 

   Private sector development is imperative to alleviate poverty and drive economic development. In developing countries, small and medium sized enterprises make up the majority of the private sector and provide most of the employment. As such, growth in the private sector generates income for many parties. The UN Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs) underscore the role of the private sector even further. Highlighting inclusiveness and sustainability, the SDGs mention the need to foster SMEs’ capacity and to enhance their participation in the global value chains(GVCs). A number of leading donors have developed Aid for Trade strategies, identifying trade capacity building or access to GVCs as key areas for support. According to the OECD DAC Statistics, Korea has provided substantial trade-related support to developing countries. However, Korea has primarily focused on hard infrastructure, such as roads and railways. It is necessary for Korea to diversify the scope of its trade-related support to foster growth in the private sector and its participation in GVCs.
   The objective of this study is to present a strategy and implementation plan for Korea’s Aid for Trade. In particular, we focused on strengthening developing countries’ access to GVCs. We reviewed literature to provide an overview of discussions in the international community regarding GVC participation and economic development. In the case study of Vietnamese participation in GVC, we conducted a field study as well as quantitative data analysis. Finally, we undertook an extensive literature review in order to analyze the AfT strategies and GVC support programs by major donors and multilateral organizations. Incorporating the findings from each section, we suggested an overarching policy direction on AfT for the Korean government to contribute to the GVC participation of developing countries’ SMEs. The following is a summary of the chapters of this report.
   This study begins by presenting discussions on the role that GVC participation plays from the perspective of developing countries when it comes to advancing sustainable development. From a developing country perspective, we review the discussions on how participation in global trade will foster sustainable development, the benefits and barriers to GVC participation, and policy measures to promote GVC participation. The SDGs emphasize SME productivity enhancement, export competitiveness, and high-quality job creation in connection to participation in GVCs. Nevertheless, developing countries face a number of complex constraints to participate in GVCs. Such challenges vary depending on the stages of GVC participation, that is, entry – integration – upgrading. Therefore, different policy measures are required depending on the stages of GVC participation.
   In Chapter 3, we identify the benefits and constraints of GVC participation for SMEs in developing countries. As a concrete example, we selected Vietnam, a major export partner and also an ODA recipient of Korea. Based on data analyses, we draw implications for developing a support strategy. First, we analyze the supply and purchase relationship of Vietnamese enterprises in the electronics and food processing industries. Conducting an empirical analysis of the productivity premium associated with GVC participation, we seek the correlation between GVC participation and technology competence as well as the level of technological competence required to upgrade within the GVCs.
   An examination of the supply and purchase relations of Vietnamese electronics and food processing enterprises revealed different characteristics between the two industrial sectors. In the electronics industry, enterprises – often large in size – supplied intermediate goods to the global market. In the food processing industry, local SMEs procured intermediate goods to domestic food processing enterprises, and these larger enterprises engaged in the GVCs by providing final goods to the global market. In other words, enterprises in the food processing industry engage with the GVCs through the export of finished products, whereas enterprises in the electronics industry often subcontract with foreign companies. Companies in the electronics industry are highly focused on a small number of overseas buyers. Therefore, they are exposed to a large chance of progressing into a structure that is dependent on overseas firms. On the other hand, the transfer of technology was more likely in the electronics sector compared to food processing.
   The correlation between participation in GVCs and corporate productivity premium revealed different impacts according to the level of GVC participation. Despite large employment, firms with high GVC participation rate displayed low productivity, signaling that the learning effect of GVC participation is low. Analysis of the correlation between participation of GVCs and technology competence from 2013 to 2017 was also low, meaning that there was little technology development.
   Summing up the analysis from Chapter 3, we conclude that in Vietnam – and other similar countries – Korea should focus on assisting the enterprises to advance within the GVCs by enhancing their technology capacity. Needless to mention, adequate institutions and policy are required. In particular, cooperation between enterprises could be enhanced rather than measures to facilitate trade and reduce trade costs. During the field study, we observed a large demand for increasing partnership between enterprises to foster technological capacity. In response, an innovative partnership program between and among the public and private sector can be beneficial.
   In Chapter 4, we review the strategies and programs regarding AfT and GVC participation of selected donors and multilateral organizations. Upon conducting a thorough investigation, we identified a number of characteristics shown by different donors and organization. The German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has been promoting Aid for Trade under an organized strategy since the early 2000s. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) emphasizes strengthening trade capacity in order to expand participation in GVC. In addition, the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) promotes SME trade capacity building under an SME development strategy. As a designated UN agency for industrial development, the UNIDO supports SME development and trade capacity building. In sum, all of the organizations reviewed maintained some level of strategy regarding AfT or GVC participation. They provided systematic support based on their respective strategies. While considering the various challenges and barriers to GVCs, they also took account of their own strength and advantages in designing the intervention. Some noteworthy characteristics of these organizations can be summarized as follows.
   To begin with, BMZ supports developing country enterprises to participate in GVCs by improving quality-related infrastructure and enhancing production capacity. Furthermore, BMZ actively encourages participation from the private sector – both German and developing countries. On the other hand, USAID supports a broader inclusion of developing country stakeholders to GVCs by increasing agricultural productivity, developing service industries, conforming to international standards, increasing private sector participation, and improving trade-related institutions. The Swiss SECO diversifies its partnership strategy and performance framework according to the country’s development stage. In the case of Vietnam, SECO works to promote entrepreneurship, sustainable trade and competitiveness, and resource efficiency for Vietnamese SMEs. UNIDO assists trade-related institutional building and trade cluster development, maximizing the use of its vast network of cooperating partners.
   Korea has accomplished remarkable economic growth over the past decades, largely due to active trade. Therefore, Korea possesses a wealth of experience in trade and development. However, these valuable experiences have not yet been applied to intenational development cooperation. Furthermore, official development assistance(ODA) is delivered in an uncoordinated manner without clear guidance or strategy on AfT. In addition to stressing the urgent need to develop guidance/strategy on AfT, the study suggests the following points for further consideration.
   First, it is necessary to expand AfT activities beyond economic infrastructure construction projects to those that can improve production capacity. Our analyses and interviews with local enterprises in Vietnam confirmed that production capacity building is most needed for developing countries to create high value-added products and climp up to the next stage of the GVCs. Since there is no AfT strategy at present, Korea can highlight the relevance of production capacity building in SDGs 2, 8, and 9, and promote the private sector in developing countries to participate in the GVCs.
   Second, GVC-related interventions require an industry-specific approach. In our analysis, different industry sectors showed significant differences in the challenges and capacity to access the GVCs. Therefore, support programs must be customized by industry to address the different challenges each industry is facing. For example, in the case of electronics, transfer of technology can occur during interactions with foreign companies through the close link between local firms and overseas firms. However, the food processing industry has little need for interaction with foreign companies during production, and therefore technology diffusion is unlikely. ODA to promote further cooperation between Korean and Vietnamese enterprises can be beneficial for the electronics sector, whereas knowledge sharing on trade regulation and support on regulation-related capacity building is more valuable for the food processing industry. International Development cooperation programs for different industries must vary in line with the characteristics of the industries.
   Third, there is a need to further enhance private-to-private partnership between enterprises in developing countries and Korea. The German BMZ promotes a program to enhance the technical capacity of developing countries so they can access to and advance within the GVCs. A noteworthy element is that the program targets its support to EU (and German) companies which will expand their businesses to developing countries while integrating the value of mutual benefit. We also experienced a strong desire from the private sector in Vietnam to collaborate more closely with the Korean private sector during the field research. Especially for a middle-income country like Vietnam, and for a technology-intensive sector like electronics, the public sector should take on a role that is innovative in encouraging active private partnership between two countries.
   Finally, it is important to provide consistent support to elevate the trade-related capacities of individuals and institutions at parmer countries. Considerations should also be made to harmonize development cooperation and trade policy throughout these support measures. While Korea is already providing support to trade facilitation programs, there is room to improve. Our field study has revealed a number of challenges in non-tariff barriers in trade, such as sanitary and phytosanitary(SPS) measures. For instance, in order to foster Vietnamese enterprises’ participation in the GVCs, technical assistance is needed to improve the capacities of Vietnamese food processing enterprises to meet SPS. 

Introduction

Chapter 1. International Trade in Services
1. Introduction to International Trade in Services
2. Historical Trends in International Trade in Services
3. Intelligent Automation, Services Trade, and Outsourcing

Chapter 2. AI-Powered Intelligent Automation
1. Impact of Intelligent Automation on Jobs
2. Advances in Intelligent Automation and Service Occupations

Chapter 3. Overview of Data on International Trade in Services and Service Automation
1. Data on International Trade in Services
2. Data on Industry Automatability
3. Automation and Service Exports and Imports
4. Data Analysis Models

Chapter 4. International Trade in Services and Automation
1. Annual Growth Rates in International Trade in Services
2. Growth Rates in Highly Automatable Service Industries
3. Growth in Services Trade in Developed vs. Developing Economies
4. Growth in Services Trade by Different Levels of ICT Development
5. Growth in Services Trade in High GDP/Income vs. Low GDP/Income Economies
6. Growth in Services Trade by APEC Member Economies
7. Analyses of Select APEC Member Economies
8. Summary of Key Findings

Chapter 5. Policy Implications and Recommendations for APEC
1. Principles for Policies and Regulations for Intelligent Automation
2. Recommendations for Policy Directions
3. Policy Recommendations for APEC Member Economies
4. Roles of Korea in Promoting Shared Prosperity in APEC Economies

Conclusions

Appendix

Executive Summary 

   The advances in intelligent automation enabled by artificial intelligence (AI) could make a wide range of service jobs obsolete at an accelerated speed. These jobs that are threatened by automation include not only routine low-skilled service jobs but also high-skilled, knowledge-intensive service jobs. The service producers in developed economies have been resorting to high-skilled workers in developing economies via service offshoring to take advantage of lower wages. However, intelligent automation could offer the service firms with an even cheaper alternative than service offshoring, threatening employment in the service industries in developing economies.
   The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of intelligent automation on international trade in services. We posit that AI-powered intelligent automation reduces the demand for service offshoring, which, in turn, leads to a decline in international trade in services. To test this hypothesis, we use multiple data sets including the U.N. Comtrade trade data over the period from 2000 to 2016, the O*NET data, the World Bank Open Data, and ITU’s ICT Development Index (IDI). We run a series of regression analysis to take a deep dive into the temporal patterns of international trade in services.
   We find that the annual growth of international trade in services over the period from 2000 to 2016was 1.67%. However, we observe that the annual growth rate significantly declined from 2014 after healthy growth between 2008 and 2014. However, whereas highly automatable service industries such as financial services, information services, and professional services experienced a negative annual growth rate from 2014, other less automatable services industries did not experience a significant decrease in their annual growth over the same period. Therefore, we could infer that intelligent automation replaced service offshoring of highly automatable services and as a result, international trade in those services declined.
   Our further analysis shows that the exports in highly automatable services from developing economies to developed economies witnessed a significant decline since 2014. However, we did not find the same pattern in less automatable service industries. We also see that, over the period from 2000 to 2016, the annual growth in the service exports from countries with a low level of ICT development to countries with a high level of ICT development was significantly lower than that from countries with a high level of ICT development to other countries. This finding is consistent with prior findings that ICT facilitates international trade. However, since 2014, we are witnessing a decline in both the exports and the imports in services in countries with a high level of ICT development. This decline was more significant in highly automatable service industries. We could infer that countries with a high level of ICD development have more advanced intelligent automation technologies, which reduce the demand for service offshoring.
   When we limit the scope of our data analysis to 21 APEC member economies only, we still find the same results. While highly automatable service industries experienced a decline in international trade since 2014, less automatable service industries did not experience such a fall. Another interesting finding is that the exports from the developing economies within APEC to the developed countries within APEC decreased more significantly than the exports from the developed to the developing, from the developed to the developed, or from the developing to the developing economies. Finally, it is found that China, India, Korea, and Russia experienced growth in service exports until 2012 but since then witnessed a decline in service exports starting from 2012.
   We discuss the implications of these findings and offer policy recommendations. We present five guiding principles for regulations and policies for intelligent automation technologies, ten policy directions, and six specific policy recommendations for APEC member economies. Finally, we discuss how South Korea can serve as a model and contribute to promoting shared prosperity in APEC member economies. 

   Mongolia is one of the twenty four key partners with South Korea in accordance with the Second Medium-Term Development Plan of the ODA from 2016 to 2020. South Korea has been the second largest bilateral partner with Mongolia among countries participating in the international development cooperation projects for Mongolia. Although the health sector has been emphasized in the Second Mongolia Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) announced in 2016, South Korea's cooperation in health sector of the ODA projects has been limited to the hardware-based business of establishing healthcare infrastructures or to strengthening the capacity of healthcare personnel.
   Since the international cooperation strategies for Mongolia includes the health sector, it is necessary for the domestic development partners to understand the health level of Mongolia and the health care system in order to find a way to cooperate with Mongolia for development of health sector. The partners also need to be aware of the donor countries that are involved in the projects and the contents of their collaboration with Mongolia. In addition, it is essential to examine how Korea has proceeded those development projects in Mongolia so far and difficulties it has faced.
   Therefore, this study aimed to investigate how major donor countries and health related multilateral organizations such as WHO have supported the development of health sector in Mongol, based on the understanding of the current status of Mongolian health and health policy and systems. The purpose of this study is to describe the current status and the challenges regarding Korea 's cooperation in developing health sector in Mongolia and find implications for our future cooperation.
   This study found that Mongolia has problems related to a low population density compared to its vast land, a severe regional imbalance in health infrastructures, and a high burden on non-infectious diseases. Mongolia has been striving to strengthen its national healthcare capacity in line with the Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals. As a result, Mongolia has achieved success in the prevention and management of infectious diseases, which led the major donor countries to redirect their support from basic health area to general health area, focusing on strengthening health care systems and improving the quality of health care services.
   Mongolia is a middle and low income country. Mongolia has constantly enhanced the accessibility of health care service in order to improve the public health and the health care system through introduction and modification of the health insurance to benefit the entire population, an establishment health care system through 1st, 2nd and 3rd national plans, and employment of telemedicine. However, Mongolia faces a financial burden which makes it difficult to invest in continual development of the healthcare sector due to the recent declination of economic growth rate and economic recession accompanied by inflation and a rise of exchange rates.
   Mongolia has not only put its own efforts into coping with health issues, but also promoted development cooperation projects with various multilateral and bilateral parties for the improvement in health sector. This study examined the cooperation projects of major donors such as Japan, Luxemburg, WHO, and ADB. This study found that the major donors' projects for the development of the Mongolian health sector were being carried out in a variety of ways. While the cooperation projects are different according to the donor countries, they commonly aim at achieving universal health care coverage called 'leaving no one behind' which Mongolia has been pursuing. In addition, the major donors were utilizing a cooperative network among the various development partners to implement the health sector development cooperation projects. The major donors have established mid- and long-term plans with concrete contents and carried out their projects accordingly.
   Similarly to the major donor countries, Korea's Mongolian health sector development cooperation projects also presents its mid- to long-term priority areas and directions through national cooperation strategies. But there is a difference in the level of specificity of the contents between Korea and other donors. In addition, Korea 's Mongolian health sector development cooperation project is centered on the health system area which is also supported by major donors such as Japan, ADB and WHO. It implies that South Korea might need to discover new support areas where are not overlapped with the support areas of other major donors, we can apply our strengths to, and Mongolia expresses as its demand as well.
   Based on the recognition of these situations and problems, this study suggests to provide customized support to meet the health needs of Mongolia and support for strengthening the response capacity to cope with public health problems. We also pointed out that customized support and support for strengthening Mongolia's response capacity should be based on establishing a Mongolian health sector development cooperation plan that reinforces network with domestic and international development cooperation partners and entails specific steps.
   Upon consideration of the needs of Mongolia and the possible application of our strengths, this study recommends projects related to strengthening the health care coverage and the capacity to prevent and manage non-communicable diseases, such as strengthening the Mongolian healthcare workforce capacity through advanced training and providing technical support to improve health information system, as parts of the customized support and support to strengthen the response capacity.