This study explores the formation and the characteristics of Latin American elites focusing on Mexico, Brazil, Peru and Chile. The reason why these four countries have been chosen for the study is not because they represent the region but because they are relatively the most significant countries in terms of their relation with Korea.  Therefore, what we found in this study regarding the formation and the characteristics of the elites are not duplicable to the other Latin American countries. Considering the importance of the topic as well as the diverse context of Latin America, the further research on elites in other Latin American countries will be important to foster more complex and comprehensive understanding of the elites in Latin America.
This study does not aim at establishing a new theory on Latin American elites. Rather, it practically approaches to the subject of elites in order to contribute to better relations between Latin America and Korea since the elites are such an important social actors. As a result, this study turns out to differ from recent development of elite studies literature which focuses on analyzing the impact of conflicts or cooperation among the elites on democratization process. 
Each case study shares the following structure. First, it analyzes the elite formation process. In order to comprehend the characteristics of the elites, the elite formation process is an important element to look at. The elite formation process is not just a simple historical fact yet it proves to determine the characteristics of today’s elites. Various historical factors such as the strength of colonial power, the role of local elites in independence, the existence of powerful regional elites in the process of nation building, the power of rural elites, the degree of diversification of elites result in different characteristics of elites in each country. Therefore, looking at the elite formation with emphasis on significant historical events, we tried to deepen our understanding of the characteristics of elites in each case. 
Second, we examine various sectors of the elite structure. As mentioned before, due to different historical formation, different sector of the elite in each country has different level of power. For example, in Chile and Peru, economic elites have stronger power among others, while political elites are relatively more predominant in Mexico and Brazil. Furthermore, when Mexico and Brazil, whose size  is rather big among Latin American countries, tend to have stronger local elites such as governors, relatively smaller countries in this study such as Peru and Chile turn out to form stronger elite concentration around each capital, Lima and Santiago, respectively. In Peru, the military elite maintains its power to some extent while in Mexico the military does not form a part of power elite because of institutionalization of social conflicts. Chile, which appears to have a strongly unified elites, tends to have powerful media elites which play a major role in national politics with its economic as well as political power. However, Peruvian as well as Brazilian media did not grow into such power. In case of religious elites, Peru and Chile where the society in general is socially conservative posses relatively more powerful religious elites than Mexico and Brazil.
Such diversity in Latin American elites led us to focus this study on specific elite groups depending on each country’s context instead of researching same groups in each case. Political elites and economic elites were commonly discussed in each case while military elites, media elites and religious elites were chosen depending on its significance in the case. This approach is appropriate for the study because its purpose is to explore the characteristics of those who have power in the policy making process from power elite perspective.
Finally, this study surveys how elites act to realize their interests. We analyzed Chilean case, which seems to have unified elites, in terms of how the unity could be maintains by looking at their recruiting methods, their religious conservatism, and their strategy of alliance. In Peruvian case, this study scrutinizes the power relations among principal elite groups such as economic elites, political elites and military elites. In addition, the interactions among the elites were carefully analyzed in order to verify their style of governing. Meanwhile, Brazilian case, where we can find rather more diversified elites, gave us insights on how power has been shared among different sectors of elites. Mexico, which also appears to have a more diversified elites, elucidates how different sectors of elites could acquire governance by internal integration.
As a result, this study contributes to more comprehensive understanding of Latin American elites by looking at their historical formation process, their characteristics as well as current status of their power structure. Therefore, this study offers a base for future researches on Latin American elites as well as politics of the region in general.  It also provides a practical knowledge on the elites in Latin America who play a significant role in the relation between Korea and Latin America. 

The purpose of this study is to analyze the investment environment of Brazil's northeast region which has received a great deal of attention recently for its potential. Suggestions are made for Korean companies seeking to expand investment.

This report consists of six chapters as follows:
The study begins with an introductory chapter, followed by chapter two that provides an outline of the economy of the northeast region of Brazil from four different perspectives: geographic, economic, industrial and trade structure.
In chapter three, the investment environment of the region is closely analyzed, with focus on the government's investment promotion policy and its system, labor market, infrastructure, and market potential.
Chapter four looks into the current situation regarding the expansion of foreign companies into this region and their strategy. In particular, companies from China, Japan, and France are closely examined; eliciting implications for Korean companies.
Chapter five introduces promising businesses with good prospects for success. These businesses were discovered after an in-depth analysis of the diverse development plans for the region, such as the Regional Development Plan for the Northeast Region (PRDN), PAC-2(Growth Acceleration Program 2), and those plans related to the 2014 World Cup.
Lastly, in chapter six, analyses in previous chapters are combined and provides suggestions for Korean companies seeking to make inroads into Brazil's northeast region. This chapter develops a SWOT analysis on the investment environment of this region after examining the state of Korean investment in Brazil and investor performance. Some practical measures are also suggested at the corporate and government level.
Suggestions at the corporate level include: ① entry strategy based on classification of investment purposes ② active participation in government projects ③ diversification of investment regions ④ expansion strategy tailored to regional characteristics and ⑤ collaboration with local companies. As for suggestions at the government level, they include: ① enhancement of institutional cooperation with local governments ② expansion of Knowledge Sharing Programs (KSP) ③ establishment of the Korea-Brazil economic cooperation center ④creation of exclusive industrial complex for Korean companies.

This study analyzes Myanmar’s external economic relations that has been changing rapidly since the new government came into power in 2011. It specifically considers two topics. The first is the easing of Western sanctions on Myanmar and the second examines how major countries have responded to Myanmar’s unexpectedeconomic and political reforms. By systematically analyzing the fast-changing external economic environment of Myanmar, a country now considered the last frontier of Asia, this study aims to provide detailed information and policy implications on Myanmar’s transition.
US sanctions on Myanmar have been eased substantially as a response to Myanmar’s political liberalization and as an inducement for further reform. Sanctions in most sectors, except GSP withdrawal and arms embargo, have been eased or suspended to a great extent. Yet the current easing of sanctions is the result of presidential waivers all basic legislations on sanctions on Myanmar remain intact. Therefore, there is a technical possibility that sanctions can be swiftly restored should reforms in Myanmar backslide or a major political catastrophe occurs. The US used to maintain a comprehensive sanctions regime on Myanmar but now it is moving toward a targeted sanctions regime based on Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. As SDN is emerging as an important framework for economic cooperation with Myanmar, governments and businesses will need serious risk assessments when engaging in bilateral cooperation or business transactions involving the country. The suspension of the import ban and investment restrictions by the US presents an unprecedented economic opportunity for Myanmar and foreign investors, but the nuances and technical details of the new sanctions regime call for attention to its remaining restrictions and related business risks. For its part, EU has suspended all the sanctions except the arms embargo on Myanmar and offered development assistance with focus on health, education and peace.
Although the dominant position of China in Myanmar has been challenged, China is and will continue to be one of its most important trade partners, investors and aid donors. China is expected to continue its numerous infrastructure and development projects across the country although its modus operandi will have to adapt to new political sensitivities of the Myanmar government as well as public scrutiny. It will also have to face international competitionin natural resource development, infrastructural development, foreign aid, and market share for consumer goods. Japan, on the other, has been engaging Myanmar most aggressively since the reform, with offers of sizable debt relief and foreign aid. It has already achieved early successes in securing infrastructure development deals with Myanmar and is emerging as one of the most significant donors for the country. Moving to ASEAN countries, neighboring Thailand has been aggressively pursuing joint development projects and investment with Myanmar along its border. Singapore, Myanmar’s important regional ally, has proposed government capacity and human capital development as its area of specialization for assistance.
Korean government and businesses need to adapt to the new US sanctions regime. It also needs to find ways to partner with China and Japan in large-scale infrastructure development projects and in the energy sector. For development assistance, Korea will need to identify sectors and methods for concentration to best serve Myanmar’s pressing development goals while not straining Myanmar’s scarce human and government resources.

Mozambique is one of the fastest growing country in Africa, with the average annual growth rate of 7.7% since 2000. The country’s recent economic growth has mainly been fueled by the improvement in political stability and the discovery of vast reservoirs of mineral resources, which in turn have attracted a huge influx of foreign investment and thus developed extractive industries.
However, Mozambique’s gross domestic product per capita ($586 in 2011) is low and poverty rates remain still high (54.7% in 2009). The country also suffers from the insufficient infrastructure and low agricultural productivity. The Mozambican government has recently undertaken a number of infrastructure projects including power plant and power grid construction, in order to generate sufficient electricity not only for its homeland but also for its neighbours (Southern African Power Pool). With regard to agricultural development, the government has intensively focused on improving extension service, agricultural finance support facilities, and rural infrastructure so as to increase agricultural productivity. 
Given the above, this study is initiated by the idea that there would be great potential for industrial cooperation between Korea and Mozambique in filling Mozambique’s energy and food gap to the extent that Korea has extensive experience in building electric power infrastructure and increasing agricultural productivity. Hence, the purpose of this study is to analyze Mozambique’s two major industries - electric power and agribusiness industries, and to provide suggestions for Korean investors on doing business in Mozambique. The suggestions for strengthening bilateral industrial cooperation in these sectors are as follows.
First, harnessing Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement would be an option for Korean investors since Mozambique’s agribusiness is one of the major sectors to promote bilateral cooperation, selected by the Korean government. Second, forming consortium with multinational firms might allow Korean investors to share the burden and risk while compensating for their lack of capital and technology. Finally, this study concludes by suggesting promising sub-sectors of the industries: construction of power plant and power grid as well as agricultural market entry with the specialization in high value-added rice and poultry products.

This working paper has several objectives: to examine current economic situations and industrial structures in Jordan, to analyze significant and promising industries in Jordan and to provide some suggestions for Korean companies. Specifically, this paper concentrates on electric power and healthcare, respectively the foundation for economic growth and one of the most rapidly growing industries in Jordan.
Jordan is perhaps the best location to establish a foothold for entering the Levant region that includes Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria. As a crossroad between the Gulf, North Africa, and the eastern Mediterranean, Jordan serves as the logistics hub for the regions. Jordan is ranked the 3rd freest out of 15 Middle Eastern and North African countries, behind only Bahrain and Qatar in 2012 by virtue of its economic openness and socio-political stability. Moreover, as the income of Levant countries grow, the import demand in the region, in particular for appliances and used cars, also increase.
These are core goals of the electric power industry in Jordan, an oil-importing country: to secure more stable sources of energy, and to increase the energy self-sufficiency rate. In order to achieve those goals, the government of Jordan (GOJ)launched new power plant projects including wind power, solar energy, oil shale, and nuclear energy. The GOJ is also making efforts to attract foreign and private investment in independent power producers and private power plants. It is necessary for Korea’s electric power and construction companies to build business strategies on the basis of their award-winning experiences and to examine thoroughly the market trend in Jordan as well as economic and political uncertainties in the region.
Medical tourism is the most promising sector in Jordan’s healthcare industry. Socio-political stability as well as high quality of doctors and nurses attracted 180,000 international patients and the medical tourism revenue exceeded 750 million dollars in 2011. In order to attract more international patients, the GOJ reformed immigration procedures for international patients, established a medical tourism directorate in the Ministry of Health, and launched projects for hospital construction and renovation. In addition, domestic demand for medical services and institutions increased as both the population and life expectancy increased in Jordan. Given that medical institution construction gives rise to arrangements for medical devices and vice versa, it is a chance for Korea’s companies not only to construct medical institutions but also to export medical devices, particularly dental devices.

In his address marking the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Korea in 2008, President Lee Myung-bak declared ‘Low Carbon Green Growth’ as the country’s new vision to lead the country’s development for the next decades. Since then Korea has taken active measures to combat climate change on both legislative and executive front. A number of ‘green’ measures have an impact on trade and may thus be subject to global trade rules administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO).
This study examines Korea’s green measures - relevant laws, regulations, and programs - from the perspective of WTO law, and explores possible ways of harmonization of the green growth policy with multilateral trade disciplines. The concept of harmonization within the meaning of this study has both internal and external aspects. More specifically, the authors first considered the harmonization at an internal level and suggested that Korea ensure WTO-consistency of its domestic green measures. For this purpose, they examined green measures in three domestic policy areas, such as market opening, industrial subsidies, and technical barriers to trade. Then, they proceeded to see how the global climate regime and the multilateral trade regime could be harmonized on an international plane, and what Korea’s contribution to this process should be.
With respect to the market opening policy, the authors considered, inter alia, GATT-based implications of a carbon tax, import restrictions arising from the emissions trading system and the Bonus-Malus system for car purchasers - the measures that are not currently applied in Korea, but are used by other countries. As for the industrial support policy, Korea’s green subsidies have not yet been complained of in WTO disputes, but were targeted by US countervailing measures - something that should be paid attention to by Korean policy-makers when designing green incentive schemes for domestic producers. As far as technical regulations and standards are concerned, a few WTO members have raised specific trade concerns in the TBT Committee in relation to some Korean green measures.
With respect to the external harmonization issue, the authors focused on two approaches, such as ‘greening’ the WTO and making the global climate regime more ‘WTO-friendly’. In order for the WTO to become more ‘environment-friendly’, the current Doha negotiations on trade and environment should be successfully completed. The authors here proposed that Korea put forward the idea of plurilateral negotiations in the WTO based on APEC’s initiatives on trade and environment. Korea could also initiate discussion among WTO members aimed at rendering climate change subsidies non-actionable under current WTO subsidy disciplines. Moreover, the authors suggested that the Korean government establish environmental impact assessments for its trade treaties so as to ensure that, inter alia, WTO agreements entered into by Korea reflect environmental concerns. In this way, Korea could have an indirect influence on the greening of the WTO. Finally, with a view to making the global climate regime more WTO-friendly, Korea should support a proposal of several countries to discuss within the UNFCCC framework the impact of climate-related response measures on trade, but oppose the idea of introducing a total ban on unilateral response measures. Such a ban would come into conflict with the GATT general exception clause (Article XX) - a WTO provision that can be invoked to justify environment protection measures.

 

Within the context of historical and socio-economic complexities and implications, this study aims to deal with land issues in South Africa, which have been a major point of debate since the middle of the 17th century when the white settlers’ contact with indigenous peoples was formally initiated. Against this background, first, the current study focused on examining the perceptions and practices of peoples concerning the land uses and values in South Africa. Second, it covered the land tenure system during the pre-colonial period as well as the processes of European settlers’ land plunder since the middle of the 17th century. Third, it examined a number of negative aspects of land policy during the Apartheid era (1948-1993). Since the demise of Apartheid system, finally, it explored the ANC-led government land policy from the onset of the post-Apartheid epoch to the present.
Since the 17th century, South Africa was placed into the influence of white minority settlers and the British imperialists, who made the indigenous peoples dominated and degraded with being deprived of land rights. As noted, the history of land in South Africa has been marred by the domination and exploitation caused by the white settlers. This implies that the history of colonial rule and land dispossession should become a focal point of land issues in South Africa.
Once the National Party (NP) supported by the Dutch origins was at the helm of South African government in 1948, the white regime institutionally installed land private tenure rights, which created a fundamental transformation of relationships between the indigenous Bantu peoples and the whites with causing the destructive and harmful situations for the black societies. The Apartheid regime established and implemented legislation for denying the ownership rights of black people. As a result of the enactment of the Native’s Land Act of 1913, the black had to move from their land to the reserved area called Bantustan. Moreover, this caused the distorted land situations in which the white minority only accounting for less than 15% occupied more than 70% of the entire land in South Africa.
After the end of the Apartheid period, the new South African government facilitated the market-led land reform programs. Given the programs sought to correct the injustice of land redistribution, reduce the poverty, contribute to the sustainable uses and development of land and economy and set up a balanced and equitable land tenure rights, they were initially treated as an ambitious and proper approach to the land problems in South Africa. However, the post-Apartheid government has been confronted with a number of difficulties while protecting the legacy of traditional land system. In this context, the various land policies of the post-Apartheid era can be characterized by failure, ambivalence, ambiguity, dilemma and inconsistency. This shows that South Africa has failed to eradicate the old and deep-rooted Apartheid legacy.
Livelihood based on land remains the significant matter for people in both rural and urban areas. In the midst of high rate of unemployment and unstable income conditions, many people in South Africa are placed to rely on land for guaranteeing food security and their sources of income through the agrarian productivity. This means that the government’s land policies and programs for reducing poverty should be treated as one of the primary goals in socioeconomic terms in the post-Apartheid epoch.
Currently, meanwhile, the land reform issues have become more prominent than ever. The issues retain always emotional and symbolical aspects in the national debate for the past and the future. Similarly, some proponents supporting and protecting the indigenous land system have asserted that the system has intrinsically ecological and cultural values beyond the economic benefits. Thus, the government has been demanded of reconsidering the meaning and value of cultural features as well as economic ones in dealing with the land policy. Additionally, the government should provide farmers a substantial access to land which is mainly approached by them for the purpose of making a living. Moreover, some government policies for the future are supposed to protect and enhance the flexibility and freedom of choice for the individual.
Under the circumstances, the main purpose of land reform in South Africa should be highlighted within the equitable land rights and redistribution. The problem is that the South African citizens, particularly Afrikaners who are the large-scale farmers and the Bantu people who are mostly peasant proprietors, tend to have a strong attachment for land. In the post-Apartheid era, South Africa has implemented a multi-faceted program of land reform to address problems of historical dispossession and rural poverty, relying heavily on the principle of ‘willing buyer, willing seller.’ This version of market-led agrarian reform has been influenced by the World Bank but enjoys support from landowners and elements within the ruling ANC committed to maintaining the structure of large-scale, capital-intensive farming.
The focal point of the slow pace of land reform is considered as the potential element of conflict in South Africa. In fact, 18 years since apartheid ended, a derisory 4% of white-owned farmland has been redistributed, mainly bought from white landowners willing to sell at prevailing market prices. The rate of land transfer remains far below official targets which would be expected to take about 60 years to resolve the land disputes. This suggests that it has a potential conflict to be exploded with making little positive impact on livelihoods or on the wider rural economy.

 

All Central Asian countries have the distinction of being landlocked. This twist of geographical fate, unfortunately, has become the source of the many regional political, social, and economic problems facing the region. In particular, the economic problems have become significant obstacles to the development of Central Asian countries and the economic activities of their populations. For example, land transportation must be made via roads and rails through the territory of neighboring countries. The stable supply of energy, which is essential for economic development and people’s survival, often depends on the good will and cooperation of adjacent countries through which pipelines that supply the oil and natural gas pass through. Generally, construction of these pipelines require much investment and long-term planning. However, these underdeveloped economies often do not have enough money to invest in infrastructures and energy transportation routes. In this respect, they are suffering from geoeconomic problems as a result of being landlocked.
In addition, being landlocked makes these inland countries dependent on adjacent major powers economically and politically, as they can conduct trade with other countries only through their powerful neighbors and cannot help but be influenced by them. Central Asian countries, previously dependent economically on Russia during the Soviet era, are now dependent on China. This trend will likely continue in the medium term.
This implies that Central Asian countries must cooperate among themselves because they will not be able to overcome the problems of being landlocked without mutual cooperation. Therefore, various regional organizations for economic and political cooperation were established among Central Asian countries.
For example, there is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) and the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), among others. These organizations have various purposes and forms. However, their common goal is to solve their immediate problems and to overcome common obstacles in regional cooperation.
This study focuses on the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) in particular. CAREC works is arguably the most active among the regional cooperation organizations in Central Asia. CAREC, established in 1997, is made up of 10 member states and 6 multilateral organizations. The 10 member states include Central Asian states like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan: along with China, Mongolia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Six multilateral organizations are: the Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), UNDP and World Bank. The ADB works as the secretariat of CAREC. The number and scale of CAREC projects increased very much during the 10 years from 2001 to 2011. There were only six CAREC projects involving about USD 200 million in 2001, but the figures increased to about 100 projects and USD 17 billion by 2011.
The dominant sectors in CAREC projects include transport, energy, and trade facilitation sectors. These sectors represent an urgent necessity not only for the development of individual CAREC members but also for the development of Central Asia as a whole. The main portion of CAREC projects are in the transport sector. Among the total investment amount of USD 17 billion, 12 billion went to the transport sector, whereas the energy and trade facilitation sectors received only USD 3.2 billion and USD 2.2 billion, respectively. Various CAREC projects are currently being implemented, but the targeted goals of CAREC can be achieved only if relevant institutional and administrative problems are resolved, and the quality of economic life for the people of Central Asia would be greatly improved. Until now, the most important outcome institutionally is the establishment of regular meetings of the related officials of CAREC member states. These regular meetings allow the related officials to engage in earnest discussion of their common problems, not to mention reinforce cooperation.
Several Korean companies have already participated in CAREC projects for road construction, construction inspection and etc. For the future, prospective CAREC projects include power grid construction, renewable energy, and energy efficiency in the energy sector. In trade facilitation, it is necessary to utilize the Official Development Aid as a participation strategy, or participate together with other multilateral organizations in CAREC projects.

 

It is noted that the formation of the Strategic Triangle of Russia, China and India is one of the most significant political events in the rearrangement of world order after the Cold War. After President Yeltsin defined the situation after the end of the Cold War as a ‘cold peace’ and proposed the idea of strategic co-operation among the three nations in 1993, the initiative was taken in 1996 by Yevgeny Primakov, then Russian foreign minister, who supported the idea of 'eurasianism.' Since 2006, after their declaration of the Year of Russia, Year of China and Year of India, the three nations have endeavored not only to enhance political-economic cooperation but also to build common values by taking a cultural approach. The Strategic Triangle of Russia, China and India, which can be interpreted as an ‘Entente Cordiale,’ can be defined as a ‘political alliance’ or ‘quasi-alliance’ closer to a network alliance rather than a military alliance. This paper is composed of three main parts. First, this paper outlines a brief history of Sino-Russian relations which has demonstrated dual aspects of conflict and cooperation since the Cold War era. Secondly, it gives special focus to several cooperative and competing factors that exercised great influence on the development of relations between China and Russia in the post-Cold War era. Third, considering that American forces have played an overwhelming role in maintaining US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, it examines how the RIC regime as a burgeoning strategic triangle might go on to establish a multi-polar system for power balancing, under closer cooperation between China and Russia. Regarding factors of cooperation between the two nations, we can summarize some factors briefly. These include: settlement of the Sino-Russian border dispute, exclusion of the 'three evils', comprehensive economic cooperation, military cooperation such as holding joint military exercises, arms imports from Russia, and mutual exchange of revolution in military affairs (RMA), etc. As part of a search for a multi-polar system to counter US hegemony, this would involve reinforcing a multilateral or regional cooperation system including SCO, RIC, BRICs, Six party talks, etc. On the other hand, there are also some conflicts which not only prevented the two nations from establishing full-fledged ties, but actually pose a greater long-term threat to each other. There are still some factors hindering the development of closer relations between the two nations and enhancing their mutual confidence, such as engagement of the US in Asia, emergence of a G-2 system, the 'China threat' derived from the Rise of China, and competition for SCO leadership. Although Sino-Russian relations has recently been defined as a 'comprehensive strategic cooperative relationship' which has characteristics of coexistence simultaneous with those for cooperation and conflict, what is certain is that they are the most important stakeholders as well as core actors among SCO members in the course of establishing RIC as a strategic triangle. From a viewpoint of strategic pragmatism, because cooperative factors are more influential than factors for competition in Sino-Russian relations, it is anticipated that these two nations could maximize mutual interest by not only minimizing influence of competition, but engage in diplomacy for selective cooperation based on 'seeking common ground while reserving differences (literally chinese expression is qiutongcunyin).' After all, given that the US made a decision to promote re-engagement and re-balancing in the Asia-Pacific through the new policy of 'Pivot to Asia' in 2011, it would be critical for China and Russia to effectively deal with conflict factors in order to establish and develop a firm RIC triad in the future. The relations between Russia and India embodies factors for cooperation and conflict at the same time. The cooperative factors are in economics and security - more specifically, in military, science and technology. There are even cooperative factors in regional conflicts and territorial disputes. The fact that India imports 60% of the Army’s military hardware, 70% of its naval vessels and 80% of aircrafts for the Indian Air Force from Russia clearly illustrates the level of the military cooperation between the two nations. Russia and India share common interests in the issue of regional conflicts and territorial disputes. For Russia, the handling of issues related to the Chechen secession and regional conflicts in Central Asia are critical for the maintenance of national/territorial integration and stabilization of the post-Soviet space. To India, a territorial disputes with Pakistan such as Kashmir and the Islamic secessionist movements stand out as recognized risk factors. On the other hand, there are conflict factors between Russia and India like those involving the US and China. Russia does not necessarily oppose the reinforcement of cooperative relationship between the US and India; however, it would be unbearable for Russia if the strategic interests which Russia has historically possessed in Asia were damaged as a consequence. It is possible that the enhancement of military collaboration between the US and India can cause the strategic erosion for Russia in Asia, such as in Central Asia, in the long term perspective. The most important issues in the conflict factors between India and China are territorial disputes, energy and resources, settlement of the sphere of influence in South Asia, and the ‘asymmetric perception’ on strategic values between two nations. Sino-Indian relations were switched to a cooperative one with Russia as the strategic adhesive, and the conflict factors between China and India, for example, territorial disputes, have been institutionally resolved. However, if elements of the Sino-Indian conflicts are not structurally resolved, it is possible that cleavages in Russo-Indian relations will come to the surface. While the Russo-Chinese relations is a ‘strong link’ and Sino-Indian relation is the ‘weak link' in terms of the formation of the Strategic Triangle of Russia, China and India; the Russo-Indian relations can be deemed an ‘initial point’ of the link. At the time of the formation of the Strategic Triangle, Russo-Indian relations were not deemed as vital in comparison to Sino-Russian relations; however, it would have been difficult to form the Strategic Triangle if the strategic relations between Russia and India had not been restored and strengthened. The Russo-Indian relations which complements the Sino-Indian relations in the formation of the Strategic Triangle functions serves as a 'facilitating' factor in the structural evolution of the Triangle. Russia and India agreed to the formation of a multipolar system as all three countries opposed the unipolar global order, as Russia pursues the restoration of its status as a great power and defence of the sphere of its influence, while India also wishes to be a global power in the region and world. As long as the US strengthens its Asian policy such as the ‘Asia shift’ or ‘pivot to Asia’, and intensifies the strategic encirclement of China, China will continue to strengthen strategic links with Russia and india. It is clear that the strategic link with India make Russia a stronger global actor. At the same time, India can strengthen its position on global issues by establishing a strategic connection with Russia. In this regard, India is able to resolve security concerns over China and contain the emergence of China as the sole hegemon in Asia. The competition and conflict between the two groups, the Continental Triangle of Russia, China and India (which includes a Russo-Indian connection); and the Maritime Triple Alliance of the US, Japan and Australia led by the US, can lead South Korea into a strategic dilemma. The Strategic Triangle is related to the Lesser Northern Triangle of North Korea, China and Russia which is based on the treaty of amity and friendship. For South Korea which is linked to the Maritime Triple Alliance through the Korea-US mutual defense agreement, it is desirable to avoid entrapment in the conflict structure and minimize the ‘alliance dilemma’, and to establish a peace regime in the region. In order to establish the East Asia peace regime, the Helsinki Process is regarded as one of the most convincing alternative models. Given that the Helsinki Process aims to institutionalize security and peace in Europe by recognition of the status quo of borders and territories, it is clear that the East Asian version of the Helsinki Process should start from the resolution of territorial disputes and the recognition of status quo of borders. Russia, China and India are deeply involved in territorial disputes in Asia as parties of interest. Considering the situation that the US uses military 'exercises' to impact territorial disputes in East Asia, it is possible that the Strategic Triangle of Russia, China and India will also become actively involved in the territorial disputes in the region and influence issues such as Dokdo. The relationship between China and India is the weakest link in the "China-India-Russia triangular cooperation regime". The India-Russia relation has been the facilitator in this triangular regime, and the China-Russia relation has served as the driving force. But because of mutual strategic distrust, China and India could not overcome the conflicts in various spheres and this has created a 'drag' in terms of the development of the triangular cooperation regime. The 1962 war between China and India was a turning point in contemporary China-India relations and had a deep and negative impact on relations between the two countries, especially on India's China policy. Though China-India relations have improved substantially since Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Beijing in 1988, and also the agreement to establish a strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity in 2005, distrust and conflict have not gone away. On the other hand, it means that improvements in China-India relations could take the triangular cooperation regime to a new level. At present, there are both of positive and negative factors in China-India relations. The positive factors are (1) China and India desire a peaceful security environment to concentrate on economic and social development instead (2) two states need the other's collaboration in resolving domestic political problems such as Tibet for China and Kashmir for India, (3) as developing countries, they share a common interest in international climate change negotiations and multilateral trade negotiations (4) they provide diversity as a diplomatic asset that ensures flexibility and autonomy in foreign relations. The negative factors are (1) unsettled territorial disputes and the rise of nationalism which hinder (the) two countries from resolving the said dispute (2) competition for dominance in Asia where the spheres of influence of two countries overlap (3) economic conflicts caused by the trade deficit of India in bilateral trade. Considering these factors, we can lay out four different scenarios for this bilateral relationship for the middle term: strategic cooperation, cooperative relations, competitive relations and strategic rivalry. Because of geopolitical competition and territorial disputes, we cannot expect the advent of strategic cooperation in the near future. Yet considering the huge political and economic costs, it is difficult for two countries to go back to confrontation reminiscent of the Cold War. The most likely possibility is a combination of competition and cooperation. If the positive factors play a leading role in the bilateral relationship and two countries succeed in separating the cooperative elements from strategic conflicts like territorial disputes, the two sides could continue to develop a cooperative relationship. If the negative factors play a leading role but the two sides do manage to avoid military conflict, a competitive relationship will emerge instead. In the latter instance, a triangular cooperation regime cannot develop smoothly. But in the former instance, it could be transformed into a meaningful multilateral cooperation forum with robust civilian exchanges and impact on the international order (due to China and India's rapid growth and huge potential). In that case, it could offer both opportunities and challenges to Korea. The main challenges include further multi-polarization of world politics which demand increased flexibility in Korean foreign policy, and the threat of increased economic competitiveness of China and India could pose to the Korean economy, especially in the manufacturing industry. But there could also be opportunities such as the increased chances of controlling China's rise through multilateral cooperation and a new large market which China and India's economic growth could provide to Korea. Despite the existence of conflict factors, the Triangle System led by Russia-China-India in cooperation with Central Asian states within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(hereafter, SCO) has raised the status of the SCO and the triangle system itself both in Asia and the Eurasian Continent. Furthermore such condition has also resulted in Russia maintaining an position of superiority, with China extending its influence in a practical and gradual way, and India making rapid and efficient advances within a short period and displaying itself under the sun; all the while checking increases in American unilateralism initiated by the Bush administration in 2000. On the contrary, US has seen its position erode although it is constantly engaged in Asia politically, militarily and economically. Ever since the 2008 Georgia War has exposed US inability in that area, it is likely to say that Russia's status became stronger while US influence was slightly reduced. The Georgian War also proved the viability of the Russian military and its firm political will, while demonstrating Russian power to countries of Central Asia, the SCO, and the triangle. One of the key reasons that the US was not able to extend its influence in Central Asia is, more likely than not, the existence of the triangle system based on the SCO. Of course, Central Asian states regard US as a main outside player in the region and as the only country capable of projecting power all over the world. The Central Asian states recognize the importance of America's global role in maintaining their independence, diplomacy, expansion of security autonomy and sustainable economic development. Furthermore, these states have to maintain friendly relations with the US which can hold the fierce Sino-Russian competition/expansionism with respect to Central Asia. However, the Central Asian states will try to cooperate with the US in a manner that does not impact the triangle system and Russia-China alliance. The cooperation with the triangle system within the SCO has provided Central Asian states with a chance to establish their own foreign policies and test them. The SCO could provide institutional leverage where those states could promote various diplomatic options against China, Russia and India in order to achieve their interests and also a balance the power dynamic so that no one power attains too much influence. The triangle system, in the context of mutually horizontal relations and multilateral cooperation, has been a platform for newly independent states to proceed with state-building and system transition in a stable manner. Therefore, we can conclude that the relations to the triangle system within the SCO has been somewhat beneficial for Central Asian states, in terms of enhancing their status as sovereign states, securing respect for their sovereignty and common security, extension of diplomatic autonomy, economic development, and mediation of regional conflicts and disputes. The relation between Central Asian States and the triangle system within the SCO has implications for Korea as follows: first, the multilateral organization where powerful states participate could lead to remarkable reduction in the level of uncertainty in terms of security for weak states. The experience of Central Asia clearly shows that conflicts and disputes among the region's small countries and also between the major powers and small states could be efficiently mediated and managed. For instance, since 2000 when the SCO has been fully activated, conflicts over territory among member states have been brought under control. The region's history contain its share of upheavals and events such as the Andijan uprising, but they are unlikely to characterize events at the international level. Therefore, it offers a useful reference for Korea, who has its own issues and conflicts such as six-party talks, relaxation of tensions between North and South Korea, territorial conflicts in East Asia, disputes regarding history and so on.

 

In Central Asian countries, the volume and role of SWFs (sovereign wealth funds) have gradually increased. SWFs in Kazakhstan (NFRK, National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan) and Azerbaijan (SOFAZ, The State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan) have increased notably in recent years because of growing incomes from energy exports. They were founded around same time: NFRK was established in 1999 and SOFAZ was established in 2000. They were also established in a similar manner, by presidential decrees. As of July 2012, total assets for NFRK is at 58.2 billion dollars and while the figure for SOFAZ is 32.6 billion dollars.
There are some similarities in the role and management strategies of SWFs in two countries. SWFs of two countries have the following similarities in terms of the roles.
First, SWFs serve stabilization functions for national economies, especially in the periods of crisis. The economies of the both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan is very vulnerable because energy export depends on the global economic situation. In addition, the global economic situation is often unpredictable. If for no other purpose than for overcoming unpredictable economic crises, energy exporters like Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan need to prepare stabilization funds.
Second, SWFs can assist mid-term or long-term strategy for diversification of national economies. The proportion of energy in total exports of the two countries are high: 72% in Kazakhstan and 95% in Azerbaijan. It is vitally urgent that both countries develop industries in non-energy sectors; and the two countries have made various efforts for the purpose of diversifying their economies. In Kazakhstan, Samruk-Kazyna wealth fund was established to manage the principal government corporation. And in Azerbaijan, SWF is helping the AIC (Azerbaijan Investment Company) establish new companies in non-energy sectors.
Therefore, we can conclude that SWFs of the two countries have definite roles in short term stabilization programs and long term development strategies.
In terms of management strategies, SWFs of both countries have the following similarities. First, their investment strategies tend to be conservative. Most of their investment is concentrated in fixed assets of developed countries, while the volume of investment to shares is relatively low. As a result, the impacts on SWFs of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan from crashes in equity prices during the global financial crisis were low.
Second, SWFs of both countries are problematic in terms of transparency. In particular, SWF of Kazakhstan provides little information on its operations to the public. There is no published annual report or other documentation on investment strategy or performance. Unlike SWF of Azerbaijan, the SWF of Kazakhstan did not accept the Santiago Principles, which was established for accountability and transparency of SWFs in 2008.
In terms of the role of the President, Presidents in both countries have a critical role in decision-making processes of SWFs. Although there are committees within the SWFs, the presidents have the final say in all major issues. 
In the future, the assets of the two Central Asian countries will likely increase further. At the same time, the assets' roles in their respective national economies will be increased gradually, which means Korea will need to cooperate with SWFs of these countries. SWFs of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are willing to diversify their investment to financial sectors of developing countries, such as Korea. Therefore we need to attract investment of SWFs to the Korean financial sector.
On the other hand it is necessary for Korean companies to take part in SWF projects in Central Asian countries. Although these countries made efforts to diversify their economies, industry diversification has yet to be accomplished. Accordingly, there could be many projects with respect to the development of infrastructure and promoting the non-energy sector.
Also Korean companies can cooperate with SWFs for investment in another country. For this purpose, it is possible to combine technique, experience of Korean companies, and capital of SWFs of Central Asian countries.